BACK TO MORALITY

REV. T. SLATER S.J.

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BY
THE REV. T. SLATER, S.J.

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PREFACE

A UNIFYING idea underlies the rather miscellaneous contents of this book. That idea is that the greatest danger which threatens our modern world is the lack of morality, and that the only way to supply the defect is to learn and practise the morality taught by Jesus Christ and by his Church. On certain points of that teaching I have gone into considerable detail, which I hope will not be unacceptable to the reader. I also hope that I shall not be credited with what I do not hold. When I say Back to Morality, I do not mean Back to Medievalism, or Back to Feudalism. I mean what I say.

T. SLATER, S.J.

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BACK TO MORALITY

CHAPTER I

BACK TO MORALITY

WHEN a doctor is called to a sick man the first thing that he tries to do is to find out what is the matter. A good doctor is distinguished from a bad one in that he diagnoses the disease correctly and applies a suitable remedy. If the doctor mistakes a case of broken ribs for pneumonia he is not likely to do the patient much good.

The world has been confessedly sick for some years past, and the quacks have been busy with the patient. One said the poor patient was suffering from capitalism and applied doses of Socialism. Unfortunately, the patient grew steadily worse. Another said that the world was ill because nationalities were oppressed by alien governments. Give the oppressed nationalities freedom, the power of self-determination and parliaments, and the world would be at peace, prosperous, and happy. But that was no remedy for the disease. The self-determined nations seem to be more preoccupied than ever with self-defence or self-aggrandizement at the expense of their

neighbours. A third doctor turned his attention to the perpetual strife between employers and employed. It was to be settled by Conciliation Boards, on which both sides were represented. But somehow the Conciliation Boards failed to conciliate. A fourth doctor said the world was too old-fashioned, too rigid, too straitlaced. Give women, the young, and everybody more liberty, let everybody go his own way, everybody would be pleased with that, and would be contented and happy. And so the experiment was tried, but the results are hardly satisfactory. More skilled doctors have not been wanting.

In 1917 an enquiry was held all over the country to try to find out the causes of the prevalent unrest. The doctors who conducted the enquiry gave it as their opinion that the gravest symptom of all was want of trust. They found suspicion everywhere. The men did not trust the masters; the masters did not trust the men; nobody trusted the State; the workers did not even trust their own trade-union leaders. A similar verdict was given by the Headmasters' Conference at the beginning of the year 1924. The Conference recorded its dismay at the diminishing respect paid to the sanctity of industrial, political, and international agreements. Peace and concord among men rests largely on mutual confidence and trust. There cannot be confidence and trust where parties break their engagements as soon as they find it to their interest to do so. And that is at least one of the

chief causes of modern unrest. The cause is lack of morals: we must get back to morality.

Few thinking men will quarrel with this conclusion. Practically all men agree that there is nothing wrong with the world; what is wrong are the people in it, and their ways. If these could be mended we should have a new and a better world, so—Back to Morality is our maxim.

But we have not yet solved all the difficulties. We have to admit with sorrow that the modern world is not agreed on even the fundamental principles of sound morality. Here, too, there are profound differences of opinion among the doctors. One large class proclaims that the human will is autonomous, independent, a law unto itself. Neither priest, nor prophet, nor God himself has any right to trespass on the sacred enclosure of the human conscience. A morality which is subject to an external authority is the negation of morality and the rankest immorality. Another teaches that anyone of mature age has a right to do as he pleases provided that he does not interfere with the equal liberty of others. Another preaches the old theory that impulse is a better guide in conduct than reason, so follow your instincts. No wonder that the new morality is of various sorts, and that there are several different ways of palliating divorce, birth control, suicide, and even murder, not to mention smaller matters like pilferage and theft. Honesty, fair dealing, justice, fidelity to one's word

are old-fashioned, and hardly suitable to modern requirements.

And yet it is quite plain to anyone who thinks that here we have a quite sufficient explanation of the unrest of the modern world. The world has lost touch with morality because it has forgotten what morality is. We must recover the true idea of morality from the teaching of Jesus Christ. To anyone who will go to the right sources that teaching is quite clear and satisfactory. The rules of Christian conduct are in accordance with the nature of things and the nature of man. They come from the same source. They have stood the test of long experience, but they are not true merely on that account. They are true because they are commands of an all-wise, all-holy, and infinitely good God, given to his creature not arbitrarily or from whim, but because it is right that a rational creature should conduct himself as they prescribe. That is the true morality. We shall not find rest till we get back to that.

CHAPTER II

PURITY AND DIGNITY IN MORALS

THE world knows many things, but it does not yet know how to make people contented and happy. It devotes immense pains and energy to providing for the comfort and convenience of the body. Comfort at home, comfort while travelling, comfort while waking, comfort while sleeping, is studied by numberless keen brains and provided for by countless nimble fingers. The conveniences of life have increased enormously of late years. We wonder how people could have lived without them in former ages. And yet all these comforts and conveniences for the body do not make people more happy. Those who have them in abundance soon begin to take them for granted, and when they are wanting their absence is all the more keenly felt. And then some people have more of them while others have to be content with less, and the latter suffer from envy and discontent in consequence.

The world tries to educate men's minds, and to give them a wider outlook than their own immediate surroundings afford. Immense sums of public money are devoted to education, and anyone who wants it,

and is capable of taking advantage of it, can obtain it without much difficulty. The great majority make very little use of the education provided for them. Those who have devoted more time to it are seldom made more content or more happy by it. An increase of knowledge does not bring an increase of joy.

There is a third element in man's composition, the soul, but the world does not cater for the soul. It has not quite made up its mind for certain whether man has a soul. The question is debated, there is much to be said, the world thinks, on both sides. In the meantime it devotes all its attention to the body and to the mind, and is disposed to ignore the soul. And yet the soul is the important thing. "What doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world and suffer the loss of his own soul?"

Jesus Christ is the supreme physician of souls. He cares for the body and he cares for the mind, but the chief object of his solicitude is the soul. And, of course, he is right. The soul is the noblest part of our being, and it is immortal of its own nature. It is destined for life everlasting. Jesus Christ teaches us how to save our souls, how to find true contentment and happiness both here and hereafter by looking after our souls. "Come to me, all you that labour and are heavy burdened; learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart, and you shall find rest for your souls." We shall find contentment and happiness by practising the virtues taught by Jesus Christ,

by leading a good Christian life. It is the only way and it is the sure way. It has been tested in every condition of life by the experience of two thousand years.

To a great extent the modern world has forgotten this once familiar teaching, and therefore it has lost the secret of contentment and happiness. It is sick, and the only way to recovery is to learn again how to lead a good Christian life. Before that can be done it must be purged from many a deadly disease. Not without reason does His Holiness ask us to pray for Purity and Dignity in Morals. Much purifying will be required before the Christian standard of morals can appear in all its lustre and splendour. At the root of much modern discontent lies a loss of faith, or at least a serious weakening of it. Many writers during the last century or so have been teaching the people that science, not faith, is the modern guide of conduct and life. When Lord Kelvin wrote that science positively demanded a creating and directing Power, he was bluntly contradicted by a well-known popularizer of science. He was told that such an assertion robbed the people of the chief fruits of science, and that he knew no more about it than anybody else. Of late there has undoubtedly been a decay of faith and religion. A decay of Christian morality which rests on faith has been the inevitable consequence. The world has been flooded by the new paganism which has penetrated into every

department of life. People seek distraction, if not happiness, in amusement and pleasure. This has added a new spur to the greed for money. With money the appetite for debauchery, drinking, and gambling can be gratified if not satiated. And so the old saying of the pagan poet is repeated to-day: "Get money, honestly if you can, but at any rate get it." One is not surprised to learn that although murder and robbery with violence are on the decrease, yet pilfering, fraud, cheating, and similar offences are more frequent.

Family life is not what it used to be or what it ought to be. Marriage has not gained in strength and holiness by being secularized. Divorce, whether legalized or not, is on the increase. Birth control, which was almost unknown fifty or sixty years ago, is now openly advocated and practised. Domestic discipline has been relaxed. Parents, too frequently, will not take the trouble to enforce it; they seem to have handed over a portion of their responsibility to public authorities and to schoolmasters and schoolmistresses. As a consequence the modern child has lost a great deal of the reverence and respect which is due to parents.

Modern business is not conducted according to the rules of justice. Many who are regarded as authorities in such matters deny that justice has anything to do with business. Prices, like the weather, are governed, they say, by certain necessary laws. When

the market is glutted with goods, their price necessarily goes down; when there is a scarcity prices necessarily rise. Justice and morality have nothing to do with the matter. You might as well pass laws to punish the weather for too great or too little rain, as pass laws against monopolies and profiteering. The argument has all the appearance of having been framed in the interest of traders. It is false, but it serves to cloak a great deal of unscrupulous tampering with honesty in business transactions. There is plenty of evidence to show that secret commissions in trade are demanded and given to a very large extent. They corrupt both buyer and seller and add to the high price of commodities. Adulteration and the selling of one commodity or quality of goods for a higher and better is another fraudulent practice in business. It is done even in the sale of foodstuffs and drugs where human lives and people's health are directly concerned.

The rules of morality bind all men, and they should be observed between one nation and another as well as between one man and another. The Great War was an object-lesson to the world on the neglect of this truth.

What I have said is matter of common knowledge, and I have tried to avoid all exaggeration in my statements. They are enough to show that His Holiness had very good reasons for asking the members of the Apostleship of Prayer to pray specially for Purity

and Dignity in Morals. Prayer can do much; it merits God's help and grace, without which nothing can avail. It focuses the mind on what is really important, directs attention to real needs, and prevents us from being led astray by false issues and wasting time and energy on visionary schemes. For the problem of morals is at the root of all our ills. If only we could get the Ten Commandments decently observed we could afford to dispense with all other reforms and remedies.

This truth suggests that we can all do something more for the world than pray. We can all lead good lives, and by so doing we shall secure our own contentment and happiness, and contribute very powerfully by our example to the contentment and happiness of our fellow-men. A good life gives dignity to the humblest position, and without it the highest position ceases to command our respect. Many years ago a friend who has long been at rest told me that when he was a boy he often, in company with his father, passed by the statue of a certain king of England who was more distinguished for his position than for moral qualities. The father of my friend would raise his hat as he passed by the statue, and as he did so he would remark to his son: "I do that to the office, not to the man." Purity of morals is the best title to true dignity, and the only real test of worth. We shall be ranged in heaven or hell for all eternity by that standard alone.

CHAPTER III

THE VARIOUSNESS OF MAN

SOME time ago the place of honour in the Literary Supplement of *The Times* was given to an article on the Variousness of Man. According to the writer of the article, it used to be thought that man is endowed with a faculty called Reason. This faculty, it was said, is in all men, and in all men it is the same. By its help man comes to the knowledge of certain necessary truths which are valid for all mankind and, indeed, for God and his angels as well. Reason also manifests certain moral truths, it was said, which are also valid for all mankind. In order to acquire any plausibility, this theory was compelled to admit that all men did not possess this faculty of reason in an equal degree. The variety of opinions held by men on the most ordinary subjects obliged philosophers to admit that. But in recent years the theory has lost all the plausibility which it once possessed.

Non-Euclidean geometry has shown the true status of the necessary truths or axioms on which Euclid's geometry rests. Sincere examination of the way in which men do actually think has revealed the fact

that they think in a great variety of ways. A French writer has shown this to be true of the simplest concepts. He takes the idea of a triangle and shows that Euclid, Schopenhauer, Duns Scotus, Spinoza, and Goethe had quite different notions about so simple a concept as that of a triangle. No wonder that men's judgements and theories differ widely when their thoughts are not the same about so elementary a thing as a triangle. The old psychology split up man's mind into separate and distinct faculties, which it named the intellect, the emotions, and the will. It is more true to say that man thinks as a whole, that his conclusions are the product of the whole of his being, but as such they must only be given a personal and local validity. This is true of the moral as well as of the intellectual order.

A uniform code of morality ignores individual and specific differences as much as a uniform diet would do. In order to be judged fairly the conduct of each man should be judged with reference to the nobility of which he is capable. The points of a prize pig are not the same as the points of a prize dog. There is no one ideal of moral conduct, no one ideal of artistic achievement, no one ideal of thinking. Everyone should aim at being true to himself, and for the rest—tolerance.

And so, according to the writer whose article I have summarized, if there be such a thing as universal, objective truth, man's faculties do not enable him to

attain to it. As each one is differently constituted, each one thinks differently, the conclusions at which each one arrives are different. It would be the height of presumption for anyone to claim that his own particular opinions were true.

Universal scepticism, intellectual, moral, and artistic, is the only sound philosophy. This is the view taken by many modern philosophers. In a recent book on *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Mr. Bertrand Russell writes:

" If we could hope for certainty in philosophy, the matter would be otherwise, but as far as I can see such a hope would be chimerical."

Mr. Carveth Read writes:

" Every student of the history of philosophy must have learnt that whatever he thinks, it is probably wrong."

Mr. Schiller affirms:

" No truth is eternal; every truth has its day. But this does not matter so long as sufficient for the day is the truth thereof."

This universal scepticism is the only possible philosophy if the current theories of evolution are true. According to those theories the whole universe is in a perpetual process of change. If our minds for an instant could grasp the whole process, they would no sooner have succeeded in the task than the perception would have ceased to correspond with the facts. It would no longer be true, the facts would have changed.

But not only the facts change, the observing mind of man changes, too. It, too, is subject to the process of evolution. And thus we are incapable of attaining to universal, objective truth because it does not exist, and because our faculties are perpetually changing, and giving us perpetually different views of things.

All this adds greatly to the significance of the views expressed by the writer in the Literary Supplement of *The Times*. It shows that those views are in harmony with modern thought and with modern science, that they are the outcome and the expression of modern thought and modern science. The splendid philosophic achievements of ancient Greece and Rome ended in Scepticism.

Scepticism sapped the springs of effort, chilled the mind and heart with doubt, and led the nobler minds to sullen despair. The people interpreted the conclusion otherwise; they said: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." It looks as if the modern world were faced with similar conclusions.

Jesus Christ did not base his teaching on human reason. He claimed to be the truth, he came to give testimony to the truth, and he demanded absolute, unflinching faith in his person and on his word. Still Christian faith cannot ignore reason, nor is Christian faith indifferent to the claims of human reason.

Reason keeps the outworks of the faith, and

Christian writers have ever shown themselves valiant defenders of the legitimate claims of human reason. They refuted scepticism with this simple but adequate argument. You sceptics, they said, strive to show that no certainty can be attained in anything, that everything is doubtful. Then, your arguments and your conclusion are doubtful, and we refuse to accept them.

The theory of evolution that man is of animal origin and only differs accidentally from the lower animals is responsible for much of the modern scepticism. Instead of concentrating the attention on what man is supposed to have been a hundred thousand years ago, it is better to consider what he is now. We have within ourselves and under our eyes undeniable facts of the greatest significance. We may concede to the writer in the Literary Supplement of *The Times* that men differ much among themselves. It is probable that as no two leaves in the forest are precisely alike, so there are no two men precisely alike. One man differs from another in capacity, in experience, in knowledge, in quickness, and in many other ways. Still, in spite of individual differences, men are alike in some things. All men have a language by means of which they can communicate to each other their thoughts and judgements. No animals have a language like those of men. To have a language by which we can communicate to others our thoughts and judgements implies the power of

forming concepts or universal ideas. The concept or universal idea of a triangle is not different in different men, as the writer quoted above maintains. Euclid and Goethe may indeed have looked at the triangle from different points of view. Euclid probably knew more about the triangle than Goethe did. But both Euclid and Goethe agreed that a triangle is a three-sided figure with three angles. And when they agreed that such a figure is a triangle, they both had the same and the true concept of what a triangle is. They formed a phantasm in their imaginations when they mentioned a triangle. But the concept of a triangle was not the same thing as the phantasm of the triangle. The concept was of no definite size; it was neither plane nor spherical; it had angles, but the angles were neither acute, nor obtuse, nor right angles; it was simply a figure enclosed by three sides and having three angles. Every figure that had those characteristics was a triangle, and no figure could be a triangle without them. In spite of his mysticism Goethe was as clear about that as Euclid was. In other words, Euclid and Goethe had the same concept of a triangle in spite of what the recent French writer quoted in the Literary Supplement of *The Times* says to the contrary.

Different men, then, form essentially the same universal ideas, and they could not communicate to each other their thoughts and judgements by means of language unless they did, for they would not

understand one another. What appeared to one to be true, would not be true to another.

The power of forming universal ideas which are the same for all men shows that man has a faculty called intellect, common to all men, but not shared by the brutes.

Before taking the next step in our demonstration it should be observed that by a triangle Euclid did not understand a mere abstraction expressed by its definition, as the writers quoted above suppose. For Euclid geometry was a practical science. He did not think that universals exist in the concrete, but he knew that in all real triangular figures there is something which more or less corresponds with the universal idea; that all triangular figures have the essential characteristics expressed in the idea.

Having the same concept of a triangle as Goethe, Euclid could deduce certain properties of the figure and convince Goethe of their truth. He could show him, for instance, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. In doing so he would deduce one truth from another, he would use reason, and Goethe would readily assent to the validity of the demonstration. He would say, Yes, it must be so. The conclusion is true, in fact it is a necessary truth. And all men who are normal would say the same. Even the sceptics would agree in their lucid intervals. Hence a conclusion of no slight importance. Man is an animal endowed with reason quite different from

the irrational brute. Man by using his reason rightly can arrive at the knowledge of certain necessary truths of the intellectual and moral order. On them he can raise an enduring structure; he cannot build on the quicksands of scepticism.

CHAPTER IV

LIFE IN COMMUNIST RUSSIA

ALL who are interested in Socialism—and who is not interested in that very practical question?—should pay great attention to what is happening in Russia. During the last few years Russia has been the theatre of a gigantic experiment in that form of scientific Socialism which was advocated by Karl Marx. A well-organized party, consisting now of about 200,000 people, seized the reins of government and imposed its will on 120,000,000 Russians. Private ownership of property was abolished, and in the name of the People's Revolution, of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, all productive property and all capital were vested in the Commonwealth. At the head of the Communist party are about six individuals who exercise despotic sway in the name of the People.

All the circumstances were exceedingly favourable for a huge experiment in Marxism.

The people were docile, accustomed to obey, and illiterate. At first they could not distinguish between high-sounding phrases and realities. Bitter experience was soon to teach them. In Marxian

theory all were to work, and whatever portion of the product was not required for the personal support of the producer was handed over to the State. In return the agriculturist, for example, received what he required of other goods produced by other citizens of the State. In practice it was soon found that the agriculturist was loth to part with his surplus of corn. He kept some for seed for the crop of next year. He did not want any manufactured goods, and he was loth to part with what his own labour had brought him. On Marxian principles he should have checked these capitalistic propensities, but Marxism offers inadequate motives for self-denial, and, in spite of political revolutions, human nature still remains very selfish.

The Government seized the seed-corn when it could find it, and thus caused the great Russian famine. Production was also diminished by unwillingness to work. Laziness is another of the propensities of poor human nature, and the glory of working for others makes small appeal to many people.

Hence, as Trotsky, one of the six, explained to the Third All-Russian Trade Union Congress of 1920, it was necessary to introduce military discipline into the field of labour. Those who had served as officers in the Red Army must be employed to conscribe and militarize labour. The way to Socialism lay through the highest and most intensive develop-

ment of the State. Workers must go where they are commanded to go, and work at what they are commanded to work at. They must allow themselves to be moved like pieces of machinery. To disobey, to strike, was treason against the People's Revolution and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

Even the docile people of Russia were not ready for such measures as these, and Marxian Communism broke down almost at once. At the present time there is no system at work, but muddle and confusion reign everywhere. Necessity has compelled a return to some extent to the system of wages. Unemployment in Petrograd and Moscow is as acute as in England, and wages are much lower. No one is permitted by law to receive more than about five shillings a week. Industry and trade are diminishing. Discontent is general among the working class as well as among the better educated.

At the cost of murders without number and wholesale robbery individual capitalism has been suppressed in Russia, but State Capitalism has been introduced in its stead. State Capitalism has all the evils of the old system and has many others besides. "Graft," or official corruption, prevails everywhere. Meanwhile, the condition of the people is worse than ever.

A Special Correspondent of *The Times* has described how Communism in Russia has affected the home in large cities like Moscow. Immediately after

the Revolution all the house property of Moscow became Government property.

It is administered by a House Bureau for the Government, and the House Bureau has appointed a director to act in its name, who calls himself Comrade London. The houses are generally large, imposing buildings, leased in flats and apartments. The tenants of these flats and apartments now pay less rent to the Government, it is true, than they used to pay to the landlord, but they do not get the same value for their money. Each tenant has a ridiculously small cubic space allotted to him, but this space was twice reduced during the seven months which the Special Correspondent spent in Moscow. Comrade London seems to take delight in breaking up all family privacy, and uses his power to quarter undesirable strangers on families and individuals.

A man sometimes finds that a person of the other sex has been installed in his room, and he is under the necessity of sharing it with her. Communists recognize no class distinctions, and the same house is inhabited by professors, engineers, students, clerks, chauffeurs, blacksmiths, tailors, and carpenters. The affairs of the house are entrusted to a committee or soviet of its inhabitants. A volume containing the housing laws in force is issued once a month. Some of the most voluble and self-asserting of the inhabitants made it their duty to make themselves acquainted with this ever-changing code of legislation. They

post up notices in the house urging the workers to attend the meetings of the house soviet, held several times a week, and to defend their rights.

Perhaps the lift or the heating apparatus of the house needs repairing. The house soviet discusses the question and decides by a majority of votes that the professors and engineers should undertake the expense of repairs, inasmuch as they are presumed to have more money than the rest. Such articles as cutlery, firewood, and cooking utensils have to be kept in one's own room or they are stolen. Door-knobs, electric fittings, locks, hooks, water-cocks, marble mantelpieces, water-closets, window glass, and nails are wrenched away and sold in the public market. To get a wash at the common tap, one must wait one's turn in the long queue, while similar queues are waiting their turn for other domestic requirements. Some of the more objectionable inhabitants at night introduce others more objectionable than themselves and disturb the whole house with their uproar.

Bath-rooms and other places intended for the use of all in the house are indescribably filthy. Slops are thrown out of the window, and thus the walls of once fashionable houses become caked with filth. Pipes intended to carry off water from the roof are appropriated for stoves in private rooms. Hundreds of houses in Moscow have been ruined by such treatment and are no longer fit for human habitation.

I have purposely dwelt on these details of home

life. They are not small matters in the aggregate. Such details affect the comfort and endurability of ordinary existence.

At first the Communist Revolutionaries of Russia proclaimed complete liberty of religious profession and worship. However, they confiscated Church property, and when the leaders of the Church resisted, and refused to surrender it, the conflict began. Church property was not the only cause of quarrel. It was the duty of the Church to condemn and denounce the wholesale murders and robberies of which the Communists were guilty, and it performed that duty and anathematized the leaders of the Revolution. The Special Correspondent of *The Times* gives a third reason for the Communist attack on Christianity. The Revolution did not bring with it universal prosperity, contentment, and happiness. On the contrary, the condition of the people became worse, and its support of Communism became lukewarm. Christianity was attacked in order to rekindle and keep alive Revolutionary fervour.

The terrible spy system which has been one of the chief instruments of government in Russia since the outbreak of the Revolution was employed against the Church. Orthodox bishops and priests offered their services to the Government for the purpose of enslaving the Russian Church. In every ecclesiastical institution and centre of influence these men, with Government help, placed a "cell," that is, two or

three of their own party. It was the duty of this "cell" to observe, worm out secrets, steal documents, and inform the Government of all that went on. They profess to speak in the name of the Church, and they bless the Communist Revolution in the name of Christianity itself. Communists set many of the ordinary rules of morality at defiance, but in Russia they have not succeeded in getting their own rules observed. It has been stated already that official corruption is general, and, although the sale of vodka has been prohibited, large quantities are brewed privately or smuggled into the country, and drunkenness is more prevalent than in the time of the Tsars.

One of the worst features of Communist Russia is the systematic corruption of children in the State schools. They are herded together like sheep and taught to hate the religion of Jesus Christ. Incalculable harm has been done already, and there is no hope of a speedy remedy. As the Special Correspondent of *The Times* says: "No change in the form of government can alter, for a long time, the main facts of the Russian situation, which are: poverty, wholesale demoralization, decreased production, ruined industries, economic chaos, damaged railways, State bankruptcy, and general collapse."

I will add a sentence taken from *The Socialist Movement*, published by Dr. Shadwell in 1925: "Surely the irony of history presents no such spectacle of promises, pretensions, and expectations

realized in the opposite sense as Bolshevism. Instead of peace, civil war; instead of plenty, starvation; instead of political liberty, despotism upheld by the Terror; instead of industrial liberty, a rigid, iron discipline; instead of liberty of conscience, religious persecution; instead of free speech, suppression. These things have waxed and waned at different times, but they are the standing marks of Bolshevism, which was to introduce the millennium."—*Op. cit.*, ii 50.

CHAPTER V

COMMUNIST SUNDAY SCHOOLS

THE Socialist bodies are as yet in a minority in this country, but they are organized, and they are determined to do all they can to convert their minority into a majority in the near future. One of the means which they are using are Sunday schools. Two kinds of Socialist Sunday schools, the Socialist and the Proletarian, are mentioned. The first kind professes neutrality towards religion; the second is anti-religious, or at least anti-christian. A pamphlet was recently published on *Socialist and Other Sunday Schools*. Besides these two kinds of schools, the writer says that a third kind has found its way into England within the last three years, the Communist Sunday school. *The Young Communist* for December, 1921, proclaimed the birth of the new school movement and indicated its object in the following terms:

"We, the Young Communist League of Great Britain, are now a part of the Young Communist International, and, as such, with the Red working youth and Revolutionary children's groups of almost every country in the world, are embarking on an

intensive campaign to teach the Communist ideology to, and inspire the Communist rebel spirit in, the young people of our class. We require everyone to help. See to it that you do your share, and help to realize our slogan—'All power to the workers.'"

One of the saddest features of the Bolshevist revolution in Russia was the deliberate and systematic corruption of children which it introduced into the public schools of the country. A blatant materialism was substituted for the spiritualism which hitherto had been the foundation of Russian elementary education. According to Lenin, religion is the opium of the people, it tends to make them contented, and he wanted them to be discontented in order to make them the instruments of revolution. Christianity taught them to love all men as brothers; Lenin wanted them to love only those of their class as comrades and to hate others as capitalists. Christianity proclaims peace to men of good will; Lenin proclaimed the class war. The ideology of Lenin is the ideology of the Communist International of Moscow, and the Communist Sunday schools have been established in England and on the Continent in order to spread Russian Communism throughout the world.

In an interview given to the Moscow *Atheist* in 1923, Mr. A. MacManus, President of the Communist Party of Great Britain, is reported to have said:

"The growth of Socialist Sunday schools in England is of tremendous importance in the development of anti-religious propaganda among the British masses. . . . Thus we are undermining one of the bulwarks of English capitalism, its religious organizations, which is beginning to shake. We must keep on shaking it as energetically as we can, and driving blows at it, so that soon there should remain nothing but bitter memories of the Church in England."

The Communist Sunday schools encourage the children brought under their influence to write letters to their own paper and say frankly what they think. No better indication of the effect of the teaching which the children receive in the Communist Sunday schools could be desired. I will transcribe two of these children's letters printed in the pamphlet mentioned above.

Last January, little R. Tait, aged eleven, wrote as follows: "Comrades, what are we taught at the Council schools? We are taught about King Alfred who burnt the cakes, and Queen Elizabeth with her love for dresses, whereas at the Communist Children's Section we are taught workers' history. In Council schools we are also taught 'Rule, Britannia,' and 'Ye Mariners of England,' and other such rot. We sing the 'Red Flag,' 'Red Army March,' and the 'International,' songs with real meaning in them, at the Communist Section. If we believe what they

tell us in day schools about Russia, we would think that the Russians were very wicked, but we comrades know that Russia is now the finest country in the world, having overthrown the capitalist system, and put in its place a Workers' Soviet Republic." Evidently a rising Pitt.

In December last Miss Rena Stebbins, aged ten, wrote what she thought of the Communist Section. She said: " I think the Communist Section is very good, especially for children, as when they grow up they will know about Communism. I also think it is very good to learn and to understand the Communist meaning, for it shows us how hard it is for the working class to live, how hard our parents have to fight to make ends meet, and for what use? Only to make the bosses richer with our parents' labour. So we must be given to understand how to learn to fight against the bosses, and to make this world just as nice for us as it is for the rich. We have the same feeling as them, and we work for, and the bosses don't, so let us learn how to end it all, and to learn to fight together to get our aim."

Poor little Rena! The eloquence of Cicero could not make the matter plainer.

As she grows older Rena will realize that it is not wise to jump from the frying-pan into the fire.

CHAPTER VI

THE LIGHT OF CHRIST

PHILOSOPHERS are our professional thinkers. It is their duty to make themselves acquainted with all the newest knowledge, and to tell us what to think of things in its light. Especially in times of change and upheaval like the present it might be thought that philosophy would be able to guide us safely out of our difficulties. One might expect that philosophy would have its answer to those deeper questions on the solution of which all else depends. What are we? What is this strange universe in which we find ourselves placed? Obviously, everything is in motion; where is it going to? What does it all mean? We cannot give a satisfactory answer to the smaller difficulties of everyday life till we have found a satisfactory answer to those great and fundamental questions. Can philosophy give a satisfactory answer to them?

With this question in my mind I obtained a copy of *Contemporary British Philosophy*, a book issued under the editorship of Professor Muirhead. It contains contributions on the fundamental problems of philosophy by sixteen leading British philosophers. After reading the book I laid it aside with disappoint-

ment. There is no hope in philosophy. It has not pleased God to save his people by philosophy.

One after another the writers assert that they have nothing that is certain to tell us. At most they can offer more or less plausible views and opinions. Many expressly affirm that the attainment of truth and certainty is impossible for the human mind. Apparently by way of warning, the editor tells us that philosophies are not like scientific discourses, they are rather comparable to the creations of the artist and the poet, embodying his idea, expressing his feeling, instinct with his personality. In other words, philosophies are subjective impressions of truth rather than the very truth itself. With great caution Lord Haldane tells us in his essay that " on the whole he thinks that Hegel has come nearer to the ultimately true view than anyone since the ancient Greeks." There is not much to be hoped for from the Pantheistic idealism of Germany. Mr. Bertrand Russell says bluntly: " If we could hope for certainty in philosophy, the matter would be otherwise, but so far as I can see such a hope would be chimerical." Mr. Carveth Read says emphatically: " Every student of the history of philosophy must have learnt that whatever he thinks it is probably wrong."

Mr. Schiller affirms: " Thus no truth is eternal; every truth has its day. But this does not matter so long as sufficient for the day is the truth thereof." On such a fundamental question as to whether the

soul is material like the body or immaterial, Mr. Lloyd Morgan affirms that the affirmative view and the negative are alike incapable of proof.

If, then, we are to believe these experts, we cannot trust to philosophy for guidance in the many doubts and difficulties in which we are involved. If the blind lead the blind they will both fall into the ditch. To tell the truth, modern philosophy makes no pretension to be the guide of life. The modern philosopher is not the blustering braggart of the time of St Augustine or even of Molière. He has learnt modesty. So Professor Muirhead assures us.

But if philosophy is incapable of acting as the guide of life, perhaps science will do. This is what some scientists used to assert, and some of them occasionally re-echo the claim still. However, if we give the matter a moment's thought we shall perceive that physical science is less capable of acting as the guide of life than philosophy. It is infected with the same or with greater uncertainty. The conclusions of science are only provisional and hypothetical, they are not final and certain. They are relative and progressive, and, in fact, are changed every few years. Moreover, the ultimate questions on the answers to which the conduct of life depends lie outside the sphere of physical science. Physical science collects facts and phenomena, compares them, classifies them, and thus discovers empirical laws. It cannot tell us whence we came, or whither we are going,

or for what purpose we are here, and without clear and certain knowledge on those questions there is no guidance for human life. Where, then, are we to look?

There is only one clear and satisfactory answer to that question. Early on Holy Saturday morning, while as yet there were few in the church, the Catholic Church gave that answer in unfaltering tones. With all the solemnity which the Catholic Church knows so well how to use, a procession entered the church, headed by the Cross. A triple branched candle was carried in the procession. One branch was lighted at the entrance from the fire which had been struck from the flint and solemnly blessed. "The Light of Christ," sang out the deacon. All knelt and then moved forward up the aisle. In the middle of the church the second branch was lit; again the deacon sang out, "The Light of Christ," and again all knelt. The procession then moved forward to the altar steps; the third branch was lit; a third time the deacon sang out, "The Light of Christ," and a third time all knelt. By such striking ceremonial the Catholic Church does all she can to bring home to all the saving knowledge of the only true Light of the World and Guide of human life.

Of course, Catholics do not deny that philosophy can attain to a certain knowledge of ultimate truths, but they also maintain that revelation is necessary in order that those truths may be known easily, with certainty, and without error by all men.

CHAPTER VII

BAPTISM NOT A HUMAN INVENTION

BY a certain class of modern writers Christianity is regarded as a product of natural evolution. According to these critics it is a syncretism, or growing together of ideas, doctrines, and rites which were held in solution in the Greco-Roman world during the early period of the Roman Empire. Christianity, they suppose, adopted certain elements of Judaism, and with wonderful genius mixed them with pagan doctrines and rites, took over various ideas from Roman administration and Roman law, and the Catholic Church of history finally emerged.

As an instance of the theory of this process we may take the rite of Baptism. Dr. J. A. McCulloch writes: "First let it be clearly understood that the ceremonial use of water in rites which are sometimes exceedingly simple, but at other times are profoundly symbolic and complex, though now inextricably connected with other opinions regarding its nature and power, has proceeded by a regular process of evolution from the simple use of water as a cleansing and purifying medium."

In such passages as this we see that evolution has

become a universal dogma. Religion, like everything else, must be explained by its light; nothing remains to be done but to discover facts which illustrate the gradual process. With regard to the evolution of baptism illustrative facts are discovered in the various mystery religions of the early Christian centuries. These existed in great numbers, gradually overspreading the West from the East. There were mysteries of Isis, Osiris, Demeter, Cybele, Mithras, Attis, and many more. They had their secret doctrines and rites which were jealously guarded from the profane world. If anyone wished to become an adept he was required to submit to a process of preparation before reception. His reception was an initiation into the mysteries, and quite commonly lustration, sprinkling or bathing with water, formed part of the initiation rites. Christian baptism, then, is a rite of initiation, and one of the proofs of this assertion is that certain technical terms used in the pagan mysteries, such as *illuminati, mystæ, mystagogus*, were applied by some of the early Christian writers to the baptized and to the minister of the Sacrament.

This theory breaks down as soon as we descend to particular details and begin to examine them in the light of history. A syncretism is a patchwork of varied and more or less discordant elements. The various parts lack cohesion and unity. They betray their different origins. In man-made religions like modernism this characteristic is conspicuous.

Modernism retained certain features of Christianity, but mixed with them ideas taken from modern philosophy and modern science. As Pope Pius X said, it was a synthesis of all the heresies. On the other hand, the striking characteristic of Christianity is its wonderful harmony and unity. It is the revelation of a spiritual universe in which part fits in with part; amid infinite variety unity reigns supreme; law and order dominate the whole. This by itself is a strong argument for its divine origin.

The assertion that Christianity was gradually evolved during the first centuries of the Christian era is contrary to the facts of history. Jesus Christ is the author and finisher of our faith, and its foundation dates precisely from the year of his birth. It was not gradually evolved by impersonal agencies during a course of years. It was gradually unfolded by Jesus Christ during his lifetime on earth. But there was nothing tentative in his manner of proceeding. He showed that the divine plan was clearly mapped out in his mind from the very beginning of his life. We may illustrate this fact from the doctrine and rite of Christian baptism. Jesus Christ unfolded his plan in various ways. Sometimes he taught us by his own example, telling us implicitly what he wished us to do; he began to do and to teach, says the Evangelist. At other times he taught by signs like the prophets of old. A well-known example of this occurred on one occasion when the

crowd pressed around him when he was teaching on the shore of the Sea of Galilee. There were two boats lying by the shore, "and going into one of the ships that was Simon's, he desired him to draw back a little from the land. And sitting he taught the multitude out of the ship." Catholic exegesis has always regarded that incident as typifying the Church and the perpetuity of Christ's teaching in it. At other times he unfolded his plan by word of mouth. Let us bear in mind these different ways in which Jesus Christ preached the Gospel while we examine the passages about the rite of baptism.

The baptism administered by St John was a sign of repentance for past sin in preparation for the kingdom of God whose approach he announced. Our Lord was absolutely sinless, but God had laid our iniquities upon him; he was to be wounded for our iniquities and bruised for our sins. In his representative capacity, then, he willed to receive baptism at the hands of St John. Besides, it was part of the divine plan to make baptism by water the first of the Christian sacraments: it was to be the beginning of a Christian life, the door by which members were to be admitted into the Church and the kingdom of God. To teach us by his example, then, Christ willed to be baptized. It was part of his plan. He indicated this by what he said to St John. When he presented himself at the Jordan, St John at first refused to baptize him. "I ought rather to be

baptized by thee," he said. "Suffer it now," answered our Lord, "for so it becometh us to fulfil all justice." Justice, righteousness is fulfilled by rendering obedience to the will of God. It was the will of God that at the beginning of his preaching and of the foundation of the Christian Church its Founder should teach by his example and receive baptism. It was part of the divine plan.

Baptism was to be a sacrament, a visible sign of invisible grace. By the divine grace which it infused into the soul sin was to be washed away, and a new spiritual life was to be communicated to it. It was to be a rebirth, not according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit, as our Lord later on explained to Nicodemus. In baptism we become the adopted sons of God by grace; it is Christ himself who through baptism gives us power to be made sons of God; we are born again, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. Christ merited the forgiveness of sin and the adoption of sins through his passion and death. He communicates this grace to members of his Church in and through baptism. Through his own divine Sonship he makes us the adopted sons of God. And so when, after being baptized, he came up out of the water, the voice of the heavenly Father was heard: "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased."

By baptism we enter into the Church of Jesus Christ, the kingdom of heaven, which is founded in

this life, but which extends and endures to life everlasting. Through sin the kingdom of heaven was closed to us, but by baptism we are cleansed from sin and heaven is again opened for our reception. As sons of God and brethren of Jesus Christ we are heirs of the kingdom of heaven, coheirs with Jesus Christ, and with him and through him we have the right to enter our Father's house. Not without deep significance, then, in the account of our Lord's baptism, we read: "And behold, the heavens were opened."

After our Lord's baptism the Holy Spirit descended in a bodily shape as a dove upon him, and remained on him. The dove is a type of reconciliation, peace, grace, and love, and the work of sanctification is attributed to him. Everything that God does outside his own divine essence is the joint work of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. According to the institution of Christ, baptism is administered under the invocation of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and so, fittingly, were all three divine Persons revealed at the baptism of our Lord.

Those who are best acquainted with the Gospels will be the least likely to imagine that there is anything far-fetched or fanciful in what I have been saying. Just before his Ascension into heaven our Lord commanded his Apostles to teach all nations all that he had commanded them, and to baptize those who believed the teaching in the name of the Father,

and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Faith and baptism were to be necessary conditions of salvation: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be condemned."

Christian baptism, then, was instituted by Jesus Christ. The spiritual effects which it produces in the soul are explicitly mentioned in the New Testament. They are foreshadowed in the Gospel account of the baptism of Jesus Christ himself. That a similar rite to which some analogous effects were ascribed belonged to several of the mystery religions of ancient paganism is interesting but not surprising. The sinfulness of man, the desire of purification, the natural effect of water in cleansing bodily stains, are universal facts which almost of themselves suggest a rite of lustration. The Christian rite is effective because it was instituted by God; man-made rites are not of avail to cleanse the soul. This is the answer which Tertullian gives to the difficulty in his treatise on Baptism. He mentions the fact that washings and sprinkling with water were used in the notorious cults of Isis and Mithras which were still in full vogue in his day. But he says those waters were barren, while Christian baptism produces children for God.

Some of the early Christian writers applied to baptism the technical terms used for initiation into the pagan mysteries. This is not surprising, the

resemblance was obvious, and at that time there was no danger of the literary device being misunderstood. The wide gulf between the Christian religion and pagan cults was too profound and too obvious to be overlooked.

CHAPTER VIII

THE REASONABLENESS OF PRAYER

ACCORDING to Sir J. G. Frazer, some consolation and even some hope and encouragement may be drawn from the melancholy record of human error and folly which he has given to the world in the *Golden Bough*. He thinks that, on the whole, in the history of mankind among the highest minds, there has been an upward movement from magic through religion to science.

In the stage of magic man imagines that he can manipulate the forces of nature and make them subservient to his own ends by means of magic and spells. When he finds out his mistake he goes to the opposite extreme and throws himself humbly on the mercy of certain great and invisible beings who, he thinks, dwell behind the veil of natural phenomena. Magic is thus superseded by religion, which explains the phenomena of nature as being regulated by the will, passion, or caprice of spiritual beings like man in kind, but vastly superior to him in power. Religion assumes that natural phenomena are not regulated by immutable laws, but that to some extent they are variable and irregular. This is not borne out by observation. Wherever investigation can be applied

we find every detail governed by a rigid uniformity, and we are justified in concluding that the same rigid uniformity rules throughout nature. Hence the keener minds pressing onwards towards a solution of the mysteries of the universe come to reject the religious explanation in favour of an inflexible regularity. It is thus that religion is displaced by science: instead of praying for rain, science teaches man to supply himself with a storage of water which can be used as it is needed.

Sir J. G. Frazer makes it quite clear that by religion he understands all forms of religion, the highest as well as the lowest. For him Catholicism and Christianity belong to the same category as the idolatry of Central Africa. He does not offer us any bright or consoling hope. His universe is governed by inexorable regularity and uniformity. All that happens is inevitably determined by pre-existing conditions. The universe is one vast machine. Man himself is a part in it, and all his activity of mind and body alike is determined and limited by antecedent conditions. There is regularity and uniformity everywhere. There is no room in such a universe for design and free will. Minds may be oppressed with anxious fears and hearts may be crushed with sorrow, but there is no one who can pity or help in heaven or on earth. What was inevitable has happened, and it will happen again; there is no remedy to be found anywhere.

That is not a conclusion of hope and encouragement; it is a gospel of despair. But it is not even consistent with itself. The advantage of it, according to Sir J. G. Frazer, is that taught by science we can anticipate the future, and make provision against disaster by adopting suitable means beforehand. If a drought is foreseen we can provide for it by storing up a supply of water. In other words, we have the faculty to design and the free will to adopt remedies for future evils. If this be so, everything that happens is not inevitably determined by antecedent conditions. We can save ourselves if we choose to do so. If we do not choose to save ourselves, things will take their course to our disadvantage. We can choose to store the water or not, as we like. In other words, and the conclusion is most important, all that happens is not the product of inexorable necessity and uniformity. Design and freedom have a place in the life of man, matter and force are not the only things in the universe—there is mind and spirit as well. And if there is mind and spirit and freedom in man, there is in the universe and beyond it a mind and spirit who freely created man and the universe. "Understand, ye senseless among the people, and you fools, be wise at last. He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? Or, he that formed the eye, doth he not consider?" The argument is so simple, and yet so profound. It is not contradicted by science; it is peremptorily demanded by science, as the late

Lord Kelvin said and wrote. It is only denied by the determinists of science; the Psalmist called them by a shorter name.

The terms in which Sir J. G. Frazer describes religion in general are applicable only to the religion of rather low and degraded savages. The Christian religion does indeed teach that God dwells in and behind the veil of nature, but it denies that God regulates the phenomena of nature by passion or caprice. By his will he created nature and, being a wise God of law and order, he made nature subject to natural law. God sustains nature and concurs with its activity according to the laws which he has given it. The Christian does not admit that God, having once made the universe, retires into a dignified repose and thenceforth leaves his creation to itself. Such an idea is unworthy of the All-Father. Nor, on the other hand, does the Christian believe that God is constantly interfering with the laws of nature. That idea would be repugnant to his wisdom.

The Christian position, in this as in so many other questions, lies between two false extremes. God, the Creator and Ruler of the universe, is not debarred from the house that he has built for us; he is always there and always active, but he is not always manifesting his presence and activity, he does not meddle; if he does occasionally interfere openly, it is always for a good and adequate cause. We know that we are in his presence, we are sure that he loves us, we are

convinced that he can and is willing to help us. He not only permits us to think of him, love him, and speak to him; he has imposed on us a strict command to do so. That is one ground of prayer, and another is our absolute need of him. He has promised to hear our prayers and he keeps his promise.

The way in which God answers our prayers will depend partly on the nature of the object for which we pray, partly on his own good pleasure. If we ask for grace to overcome some vicious habit, he will enlighten our minds so that we see more clearly the baseness of the habit into which we have fallen, the sad plight to which it has reduced us, and the danger of continuing in it. When we see clearly the necessity of overcoming our bad habit, God will give strength to our wills so that we form a fixed determination to overcome it. There is always something to do for ourselves with God's help. He made us without our co-operation, but he will not save us without our co-operation. If we pray for rain or other physical blessings, in all probability God will answer our prayers if it seems good to him by guiding the forces of nature. The driver of a motor-car who sees an obstacle in the way quietly brings other forces into play and his car avoids the obstacle which would have wrecked it and killed the driver if he had not intervened. The driver does not suspend the laws of nature, he only brings new laws into play. God can do with his universe what the driver does with his car.

There is, however, an important difference in the two cases. The driver acts on the spur of the moment, when he sees the obstacle. God is omniscient as well as all-powerful. He has seen every detail of the whole course of history from all eternity. He has decreed what he would do in answer to the prayers which he foresaw from all eternity. So that when the time comes, and when he answers the prayers for rain, the answer is part of the order which God has arranged and decreed from all eternity. There is no passion, no caprice here, there is the all-wise and beneficent guidance of divine Providence.

God is not a prisoner in his own universe. He reserves to himself a certain freedom of action, when it seems good to him. He who raised the dead to life, who gave sight to the blind, who by a word or touch healed the sick, and calmed the winds and the waves, still on occasion and for good reasons works similar wonders in answer to prayer. The lives of the saints, the events which happen at Lourdes and elsewhere, show abundantly that "the hand of the Lord is not shortened that it cannot save; neither is his ear heavy that it cannot hear." But these miracles do not disturb the orderly course of the universe, they do not upset the calculations of science and make them uncertain; they only give food for reflection, even to scientists if they will accept it.

CHAPTER IX

THE MORAL TEACHING OF ST THOMAS AQUINAS

THE subject of this chapter is the moral doctrine of St Thomas Aquinas. That moral doctrine is chiefly to be found in the Second Part of the *Summa Theologica* of the Angelic Doctor. There he makes use of the philosophic framework provided by Aristotle, and gives an ordered and reasoned account of the traditional Christian teaching on morals. It is familiar to all instructed Catholics. Priests study it to prepare themselves to fulfil the duties of their office. Preachers have recourse to it when preparing their sermons. The Catechism which the children learn at school is a brief summary of it.

The attitude of the learned world outside the Church towards the scholastic doctrine of St Thomas has undergone a notable change during the last few years. The attitude assumed by historians of philosophy during the mid-Victorian era towards Scholasticism was one of supercilious contempt. Nowadays it is quite common to meet with a high appreciation of the acumen, depth, and logical consistency of the Scholastics, and especially of St Thomas. As an instance of this changed attitude I

may mention the Bampton Lectures of 1916, published in 1920. They were delivered in London and at Oxford by Dr. Philip Wicksteed. The title under which these lectures were published is: *The Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy illustrated from the Works of St Thomas Aquinas.* That title is very significant; it tells us how the learned world of to-day regards the problem with which we are dealing. It is studied from the point of view of comparative Religion and Evolution. It is a question of the evolution of human thought on religion and morals.

It is assumed as scientifically proved that the whole universe is constantly changing. As Heraclitus said, everything is in a state of perpetual flux. There is nothing stable, nothing permanent. Man's nature, his intellect, his will, and therefore his opinions, all share this constant change. Evolution and change are the condition of life. Religion and morals are subject to the same law. Christianity is no exception to the rule. From the first it began to act upon the religious thought of the period which gave it birth. But the religious thought of the period none the less began to react on Christianity. In consequence, Christianity absorbed various elements belonging to pagan religions, ethnic philosophy, and Roman law. Early instances of this reaction are the stoicism of St Ambrose, derived from Cicero, and the Neo-platonism of St Augustine, derived from Plotinus. We have another instance of the same process in St

Thomas, who borrowed so largely and openly from Aristotle.

Before going further, let us try to realize how this doctrine of evolution, as commonly understood, affects the science of morals.

It does away with it altogether. If everything that happens is the necessary product of antecedent and necessary causes, there is no such thing as free will or human responsibility. Morality is merely a department of physics, chemistry, or biology. Man is part of Nature. You can describe what man does, just as you can describe what animals, or vegetables, or other forces of Nature do. As in physics you describe the actions and reactions of physical forces, in chemistry the combinations of chemical elements, in biology the development of life, so in morals you describe how man acts in different circumstances. To frame rules as to how man *ought* to act in different circumstances is unmeaning. You might just as well frame rules as to how oxygen and hydrogen *ought* to act when they combine to form water.

This is fully realized by many evolutionists. In their hands the science of morals is a merely descriptive or historical science. It describes what men have thought on human conduct; what opinions they have held on particular questions; it cannot say what they *ought* to think, or say, or do.

Another point is that evolution can tell us nothing about the end of human life. All that the evolutionist

knows is that everything is in motion. To what goal or end the motion tends he does not and he cannot know. He cannot know and he does not profess to know the end of human life; the whole question of ends, of final causes, is to him chimerical. Efficient causes are to him the only real causes. And yet, if rules as to what men ought to do are to be formulated, we must know the end of human conduct and of human life. If you are to draw a line as a guide to action you must know in what direction to draw it.

Evolution, then, is not and cannot be a guide to conduct; on the contrary, it abolishes all permanent and authoritative rules of morality. The only rule is for each one to do as he pleases.

An example will help us to realize what I have been saying. The evolutionist holds that monogamous and indissoluble marriage is only one of many ways in which the propagation of the human race has been achieved. He will perhaps go so far as to admit that, on the whole, monogamous and indissoluble marriage gives the best results. Perhaps it would be wise to encourage it as far as possible. But it has never been universally accepted, and in modern society there are signs that monogamous and indissoluble marriage is giving way in favour of much looser relations between the sexes. This tendency without doubt is part of the evolutionary process. If it is, then, *pace* Huxley, we cannot resist it, because we are part of the cosmic process. That is how evolution affects

the practical question of divorce. How can it possibly curb the wild impulses of our lower nature?

The Catholic, taught by the Church and by St Thomas in her name, looks at the facts from quite a different point of view. He sees and acknowledges that we live in a changing universe, but a changing universe does not explain itself; movement and change postulate an Author who does not change. "As a vesture thou shalt change them and they shall be changed, but thou art always the selfsame and thy years shall not fail."*

Hence the great fundamental question, which underlies all other questions, as St Thomas says,† is the question of the existence of God. *Primo, quaeritur an Deus sit.* First of all we ask, Is there a God? he says at the beginning of the *Summa Theologica.* This is especially necessary in the science of morals. God is our first Beginning and last End. He cannot possibly be ignored or left out of account in the science of duties. Our duty to him is the subject-matter of the first and greatest commandment. God is the infinite source of all Being, and he is also infinite Mind. He has a full and comprehensive knowledge of himself and in himself of all things that exist or are possible. He is thus infinite and unchanging Truth. He made us, his finite creatures, in his own image and likeness. He gave us the capacity to know the truth, not all truth, but as much as is

* Ps. ci 28. † *Contra Gentiles,* I ix.

necessary and really useful for us. By our natural reason we can know him; we can know that he is our Creator, and we can know our duties towards one another as being made by the same God, our common Father. In other words, by the exercise of right reason, we can know the fundamental precepts of the moral law which we call the ten commandments. This is the teaching of St Paul in the Epistle to the Romans (ii 14). He says that the Gentiles, who had not the positive law of God, nevertheless had its precepts written in their hearts, and that their conscience, or right reason, told them what is right in moral conduct and what is wrong.

However, modern experience is teaching us more clearly every day that reason and conscience are not very reliable guides in conduct. Many men are dull, many more are lazy, most people are occupied with other things, and human passion is apt to warp the judgement. Under these circumstances it is inconceivable that God our Creator has left us to grope after him to see if perchance we should find him. He has not done that, he has spoken to us, he has taught us especially through his own Son, Jesus Christ.* Jesus Christ knew human nature too well to dream of basing his doctrine on human reason. He did not do that, he based it on faith. He demanded unquestioning acceptance of and firm belief in his teaching on the authority of God. He came, he said, not to

* Heb. i 1.

destroy the law, but to fulfil it. He called the ten commandments, his commandments. He used and appealed to right reason in developing them, as when he taught that the commandment which forbids murder also forbids anger and quarrelling, which if unchecked lead to murder. He also appealed to right reason and conscience in his pitiless exposure of the unsound casuistry of the Pharisees. But he rested his teaching on the authority of God and on faith in his word.

There is, then, one body of truth, resting on the Being and on the Nature of God. Our minds do not make it, they only recognize its existence independent of themselves. We have two ways of attaining to that truth, natural reason and the teaching of Jesus Christ. Both right reason and the teaching of Jesus Christ come from God, they manifest to us the same truth; there can be no opposition, no contradiction between faith and right reason.

The Fathers of the Church acted upon this teaching. Tertullian, St Cyprian, St Ambrose, St Augustine, took what was true in the teaching of the pagan philosophers without scruple. St Augustine defends the practice, and says that when a Christian teacher does this, he only takes what belongs to him. All truth comes from God; it forms one harmonious whole; one truth is not opposed to another; one truth does not contradict another.

It is an axiom of Catholic theology that Christian

teaching contains no new moral precepts except those which have reference to faith and the sacraments. In other words, apart from faith and the sacraments, and the new duties imposed by them, Christian moral teaching is merely the teaching of right reason and common sense. St Thomas taught nothing new; he taught traditional Christian doctrine; he taught the moral doctrine of Jesus Christ. He did this in a form borrowed from Aristotle, but the form did not change the doctrine. He proposed Christian truth in a new way, but what he proposed remained Christian truth. He faithfully adhered to the old maxim—*Non nova sed nove.*

These are the broad and solid foundations on which St Thomas Aquinas built the moral teaching of the Second Part of his *Summa Theologica.* He found much that was true in the *Ethics* and *Politics* of Aristotle; the pagan philosopher's authority was being used against the Church; St Thomas determined to "baptize Aristotle"—*i.e.,* to make him subservient to Christian teaching, and he succeeded admirably. He reared a monument which is not touched by modern science; it remains unshaken and unshakable, because it rests on God and on Jesus Christ.

I will now pick out a few salient points in the teaching of St Thomas and briefly indicate what he owed to Aristotle and what to Christian teaching. In general, we may say that St Thomas took the form in which his work is cast from Aristotle, and the

inexorable logic with which it is developed. Much of Aristotle's teaching with regard to particular virtues and vices St Thomas also adopted without scruple, but when Aristotle's virtues and vices are embedded in the Christian scheme they almost change their nature.

The first task of the moralist is to lay down the fundamental principle which should guide human life and conduct. What should be the aim of all deliberate human action?

Modern utilitarians said that our aim should be the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Kant inculcated the observance of the "categorical imperative." Idealists lay down the principle of perfection or self-realization. Aristotle and the ancients taught that the highest good or happiness is the end of human life. St Thomas goes more to the root of the matter when he asks what is the ultimate end of human life, for, as he says, human actions are a means to the end, and the means derive their moral quality from the end. That is good which conduces to the end, that is bad and wrong which turns us from our end.

Aristotle taught that man's highest good and happiness is not to be found in pleasure, wealth, honours, knowledge, or health. It is not to be found even in virtue by itself, but it is to be found in the most perfect activity of the soul according to the most perfect virtue, in a perfect and enduring life.

Aristotle limits his consideration to the present life. His ethic is of this world and purely natural.

St Thomas teaches that man's ultimate end and happiness does not consist in wealth, glory, honour, power, pleasure, or in any created good; it is to be found only in God, in the intuitive vision of God. This, of course, is the teaching of revelation. "We see now," says St Paul, "through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am known."* "This," said our Lord,† "is eternal life, that they may know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." Man's ultimate end, then, according to St Thomas and Christian teaching, is not to be found in this life; we can only attain to it after death. It is not natural to man; man has no natural capacity of seeing God face to face, of knowing him as he knows himself. In order to be able to attain his end, which is supernatural, man must receive a supernatural gift of God, which raises him above the order of created beings and makes him a "partaker of the divine nature." He must be endowed with a new power of vision, and his will must receive new strength. He needs the grace of God for the performing of every action of his life, for thus only can human actions become a proportionate means for the attainment of his supernatural destiny.

We are told that the philosophy of Aristotle reacted

* 1 Cor. xiii 12. † John xvii 3.

on Christian dogma, that Christianity is a synthesis, or syncretism, or a patchwork of Jewish and pagan ideas. Let us test the theory by what has been said.

St Thomas followed Aristotle in beginning his exposition of Christian morals by laying down man's final destiny, but he denied the doctrine of Aristotle on the point, and accepted the teaching of Christ, who called the vision of God life everlasting. He followed Aristotle in teaching that our ultimate end does not consist in wealth, pleasure, honour, or power. He rejected Aristotle's teaching as to what it does consist in. It consists in nothing created, says St Thomas, the whole of creation cannot fill the void in the human heart—we were made for God and we know only unrest till we rest in God.

If Christian teaching as seen in St Thomas is a synthesis or syncretism, it certainly is not a patchwork, an amalgam of different ideas derived from different sources. It is derived from Holy Scripture and the teaching of Jesus Christ.

Aristotle's ethical teaching is natural, that of St Thomas is supernatural. The distinction cuts deep, says Dr. Wicksteed. It cuts to the very marrow, colours every action of human life, makes the two systems of ethics wholly different, and even opposed to each other.

Aristotle tells us that as human conduct is infinitely varied, there must be a certain vagueness and indefiniteness in moral science. We cannot expect

mathematical accuracy or always demand logical demonstration in the solution of moral problems. Hence young men, whether they be young in years or in character, says Aristotle drily, are not fit for the study of ethics. They have not the experience of life which is required, and they are too much under the sway of passion.

In other words, the science of ethics, as unfolded by Aristotle and other philosophers, is theoretical but hardly practical. At most it may influence a few of the nobler characters who are a law to themselves. The many (*οἱ πολλοὶ*) will pursue their pleasures and laugh at the fine-spun theories of the philosophers. Jesus Christ rested his moral teaching on faith. He knew perfectly well that if people want divorce, they can always find plenty of reasons to justify it. And so he simply said: "What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder." And he demanded unquestioning submission to his teaching; he taught as one having authority. The sanctions annexed to the violation of his moral code were terrible—"Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire." Here are other fundamental differences between the ethics of St Thomas and those of Aristotle. Christian teaching is couched in clear, precise, and definite commandments, easily intelligible to the minds of children, and it is backed by sanctions which appeal to all.

The Christian conception of sin is altogether

absent from Aristotle. Moral lapses are departures from the golden mean, to be deplored, and if of the baser sort, to be contemned; they are not offences of an ever present and all-holy Creator and Lord.

The pre-eminence of Aristotle as a philosopher did not save him from committing grave mistakes in his moral teaching. He taught, for example, that abortion should be practised when the population threatens to become excessive, and his doctrine concerning slavery is untenable. According to Aristotle the slave is a living instrument, to be used for his master's benefit like any other instrument. He is a chattel, a portion of his master's property, and his master can dispose of him as he pleases. All this is very far removed from the teaching of St Thomas and Christianity.

Even when St Thomas follows Aristotle closely, the teaching of the pagan philosopher is entirely changed by being embedded in the Christian system. As an instance of this we may take Aristotle's famous description of the magnanimous or high-minded man. The picture is drawn with great minuteness of detail; Aristotle seems to have dwelt on it with loving care, for it is the crown of his system; the magnanimous man is his ideal of the perfect Athenian gentleman.

" The magnanimous man," says Aristotle,* " is one who being really worthy of great things, holds himself worthy of them. For he who holds himself

* *Ethics* iv 3.

thus worthy beyond his real deserts is a fool, and no man possessed of any virtue whatsoever can ever be a fool or show want of understanding. He, on the other hand, who holds himself worthy of less than his merits is little-minded, no matter whether the merits which he thus underrates be great or moderate or small. The merits, then, of the high-minded man are extreme, but in his conduct he observes the proper mean. For he holds himself worthy of his exalted deserts, while others either over-estimate or under-estimate their merits. And since he is not only worthy of great things, but also holds himself worthy of them—or rather, indeed, of the very greatest things—it follows that there is some one object which ought most especially to occupy him. Now this object is honour, for it is the very greatest of all external goods. But the high-minded man, since his deserts are the highest possible, must be among the best of men; for the better a man is, the higher will be his deserts, and the best man will have the highest deserts. True high-mindedness, therefore, cannot but imply virtue; or rather the criterion of high-mindedness is the conjoint perfection of all the individual virtues. High-mindedness, then, would seem to be the crown, as it were, of all the virtues; for it not only involves their existence, but it also intensifies their lustre. It is with honour, then, and with dishonour that the high-minded man is most especially concerned. And where he meets with great honour, and that from

upright men, he will take pleasure in it; although his pleasure will not be excessive, inasmuch as he has obtained at the outside only what he merits, if not perhaps less—since adequate honour for perfect virtue cannot be found. He will, however, none the less receive such honour from upright men, inasmuch as they have no greater reward to offer him. But honour given by the common herd and upon unimportant occasions, he will hold in utter contempt, for it will be no measure of his deserts. Now the high-minded man justly despises his neighbours, for his estimate is always right, but the majority of men despise their fellows upon insufficient grounds. He also loves to confer a favour, but feels shame at receiving one; for the former argues superiority, the latter inferiority. The high-minded, moreover, would seem to bear those in mind to whom they have done kindnesses, but not those from whom they have received them. For he who has received a kindness stands in a position inferior to that of him who has conferred it, whereas the high-minded man desires a position of superiority. And so he hears with pleasure of the favours which he has conferred, but with dislike of those which he has received."

It is obvious that Aristotle's magnanimity is nothing else but inordinate self-esteem and contempt of others. Truth and the teaching of Christ compel us to say that it is not a virtue at all, but pride, the pinnacle of all vice. St Thomas converted it into

a virtue by making the truly magnanimous man acknowledge that all the gifts which he possesses were given him by God, that he has nothing of his own except sin, that consequently he has no reason to exalt or glorify himself, and that, as St Paul teaches, instead of despising others, he should esteem them as better than himself. Humility was unknown to Aristotle; it is the test and the foundation of all virtue in the teaching of Christ and St Thomas.

Enough, perhaps, has been said to show what St Thomas owed to Aristotle, and whether the philosophy of Aristotle reacted on the moral and Christian teaching of St Thomas so as to change it. Reaction implies change. When a bullet is discharged against a target it acts on the target, but the target reacts on the bullet, changes and destroys it. The moral teaching of St Thomas is derived from Holy Scripture —it is that of Jesus Christ. He makes the teaching of Jesus Christ the test of truth. He rejects everything that is opposed to it or that is out of harmony with it. What he adopts from Aristotle harmonizes with it completely, and only makes his exposition of Christian doctrine more orderly, more clear and more full. These being the facts, we cannot rightly talk of the *Reactions of Philosophy on Dogma*, as illustrated from the works of St Thomas Aquinas.

CHAPTER X

JUSTICE

§ 1. Introductory.

As a rule, the style of Aristotle is dry and crabbed, but on one occasion when he mentions justice he almost becomes a poet. He says that justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, and that neither the evening nor the morning star is so beautiful. St Thomas Aquinas quotes this saying of Aristotle with approval. Hamilton, the American statesman, tells us that "Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty is lost in the pursuit." Herbert Spencer asserts that "beyond maintaining justice the State can do nothing else without transgressing justice." These sayings of eminent men of very different times and schools of thought will help us to appreciate the immense importance of our subject. Our subject is the Catholic doctrine of justice. By that I do not mean that the Catholic Church teaches a doctrine of justice which is peculiarly her own, and which non-Catholics cannot be expected to accept.

Justice is the chief of the moral virtues which rest on right reason and common sense. The great Catholic writers on justice such as St Thomas, Soto, Molina, Lessius, and Lugo, took what was sound in the teaching of Aristotle, Cicero, and the great Roman lawyers on justice, made it their own and developed it. This they did in the light of the Christian faith and under the guidance and watchfulness of the Catholic Church. When rash and untrue assertions were made on questions of justice by Catholic writers which threatened to do harm, the Church interposed her authority and condemned the false teaching. Thus on March 2, 1679, Pope Innocent XI condemned the proposition that domestic servants may secretly steal from their masters to compensate for their work which they judge to be worth more than they get in wages. On the same occasion the same Pope condemned the proposition that one is not bound under pain of mortal sin to make restitution for what has been stolen by several small thefts, however great may be the total sum taken; and a third proposition which asserted that he who incites or induces another to cause great loss to a third party is not bound to make restitution for the loss caused. These are but specimens of false teaching on justice which has been condemned by the Church. They will illustrate what I mean by her guidance and watchfulness which safeguards the development of Catholic teaching on this and on

other points. When the Church has spoken Catholic writers obey her voice and only mention condemned doctrines to express their reprobation of them. In this way a Catholic tradition on justice was formed, a tradition which has the implicit approval of the Catholic Church.

St Thomas approves and adopts the definition of justice given in the Roman civil law: Justice is a perpetual and constant will of giving to everyone his due; and he says that it agrees with that given by Aristotle in his *Ethics*. Cicero defined it as a habit of mind of giving to everyone what belongs to him, which amounts to the same. It is the common meaning of the word in ordinary English speech. A man who thinks he has been wronged says, "I want justice, I want my due, my rights."

The moral virtue of justice, then, teaches us to give every man his due, to render to every man what belongs to him, to respect and yield their rights to all men. It has two special properties or characteristics.

(*a*) Justice regards others, not self; it is an altruistic, not a self-regarding virtue. It regulates our actions with regard to others, and in this respect it differs from most other moral virtues. Temperance, for example, regards self; it moderates the actions of the temperate man with regard to bodily pleasures. The temperate man takes that amount of food and drink which becomes him. There is not the same measure

for all alike; one requires more, another less. On the contrary, justice does not regard the just man primarily. It looks at the rights of others and strives to satisfy them. Whatever be the position and capacity of the just man, he tries to pay his debts to others, to satisfy the just claims which they may have against him.

We do, indeed, sometimes say of a speaker, for example, "He did not do himself justice," meaning that on some occasion he did not reach his ordinary level of excellence. But when we make use of that expression, we use the word "justice" in a figurative sense, not in its strict sense.

(*b*) The second property of justice is that it renders to others precisely what is due to them, neither more nor less. There is a determinate quantity of right in another, and justice gives it to him. It gives the driver of a taxicab his fare, neither more nor less. I may, indeed, give a driver more than his fare if I like, but if I do I practise generosity. If I do not give him his fare I sin against justice.

Justice, then, renders to every man what is due to him, it gives him his rights. Rights are the object of justice, and if we want to understand what justice is, we must try to understand what is meant by a right.

Rights are natural or acquired.

Because man is a rational human being, he has certain moral faculties of doing, possessing, acquiring

something. He has the natural right to life, liberty, reputation, respect, the right to marry, to work, and to enjoy the fruits of his labour, to own property. Parents have the right to educate their children. Such natural rights come from Nature herself, and from God, the author of Nature. They imply duties. I have a right to my life because I have a duty to preserve it. God gave it me; it is a talent entrusted to me by him, to be used in his service for my own good. It does not depend on force, on my power to defend it. The right exists in the unborn child as well as in the master of armies. Anyone who unwarrantably takes it away is guilty of an injustice against the owner of it and against God. That is what is meant by saying that a right is a moral, not a physical, quality or capacity. Might or power is merely physical; there is no moral quality about it. It can be used rightly or wrongly, morally or immorally.

(*c*) Acquired rights are such as are obtained by occupation of something which belongs to no one, by gift, inheritance, contract, or which have been granted by the Church or by the State, such as the franchise, the right to education. Sometimes it is a matter of dispute as to whether a particular right is natural or acquired—as, for example, copyright. The traditional notion of justice which I have been trying to explain will perhaps become clearer if we contrast it with that adopted by Herbert Spencer. According to Herbert

Spencer, the formula of justice is this: "Every man is free to do that which he wills provided that he infringe not the equal freedom of any other man." This explanation of the notion of justice gives too great a prominence to subjective claims and takes no account of some necessary limitations of those claims. Justice, as we have seen, is altruistic, not self-regarding; it gives others their due, it does not concentrate its attention on its own claims. Moreover, it is too absolute and unlimited. We cannot do what we please with our own life. Suicide is an act of injustice towards God and towards our country which has its rights over us.

The nature of justice may be further explained by contrasting it with charity or benevolence. Charity also is altruistic; it teaches us to love others as ourselves, to do as we would be done by. But what we owe to our neighbour in charity is not a precise and definite sum or service as is that which we owe him in justice. Charity requires that we assist our neighbour according to his need, our own capacity, and the closeness of his relation to ourselves. Charity is wider, but justice is more strict. We must be just before being generous. The two virtues should go together, for human society rests on them both. Justice without charity is liable to be hard, unsympathetic, inhuman. It is charity which makes the whole world kin and kind.

§ 2. Legal Justice.

Justice prescribes that all should have what is due to them, that all should have their own, that all should have their rights. A man has rights as an individual to be rendered to him by other individuals. As a member of a state he has certain rights to be rendered to him by the state of which he is a member. The state also has rights which justice prescribes to be rendered to it by the members who compose it. These rights are of different kinds, and so there are three different kinds of justice which order the relations which should exist in justice between individuals, between the state and its members, and between citizens and the state to which they belong. These three kinds of justice are called respectively Commutative, Distributive, and Legal. Legal justice is also called General because its acts are not confined to any particular department of human conduct, but embrace all acts which either of their own nature or because they are prescribed by law are required to be done for the common good. The following scheme will show the connection of these three species of justice:



In this section we will deal with General or Legal justice. Modern states are not mere voluntary associations, as Herbert Spencer supposed. It is true that, as a rule, a man may emigrate, abandon his country if he choose to do so. But unless he wishes to live like a hermit in some uninhabited spot, wherever he goes he will find an organized society which will make claims on his allegiance. As man is born a member of a family, so he is born a member of a state, and as he has duties to his family, so he has duties to his state, nation, or country.

The state is not a mere collection of individuals; it is an organized unity. It has rights quite distinct from the rights of the individuals who compose it. It has, for example, the right to make war for a good cause, and it has the right to inflict capital punishment on those who commit serious crimes. It also has authority to make laws for the common good. Legal justice prescribes that for the common good citizens should yield obedience to the just laws of their country.

It does not follow from this that a citizen commits sin whenever he violates a just law of his country. A law must, indeed, impose some sort of obligation; a law binds, and in this it differs from a request or a counsel. But the obligation which a law produces need not be an obligation under pain of sin. In this connection Catholic theology distinguishes between moral, penal, and mixed laws. Moral laws

impose an obligation under pain of sin; the wilful violation of such a law is a sin. Penal laws impose an obligation to submit to a penalty enacted by the law against those who violate the law, if the penalty be imposed. Mixed laws are both moral and penal; they impose a moral duty to conform to them, and they provide a sanction against transgressors.

If there is question of merely positive laws, the legislator in general may make either moral, penal, or mixed laws. Just as a father, who has authority from nature and from God to give a strict command to his children which they are bound to obey under pain of sin, does not use all his authority on all occasions, but sometimes is content merely to manifest his wish with full confidence that a child will conform to it, so the state may intend its merely positive laws to bind under pain of only incurring the penalty and not sin. That a positive law may only bind in this way seems clear from the nature of things, and it is an accepted doctrine of Catholic theology and ethics. With regard to any particular law or system of laws it is merely a question of fact. Is this particular law a penal law or not? Is this particular system of positive laws a system of penal laws or not? With regard to English positive laws it is the well-grounded opinion of Blackstone and other authorities that they are penal laws, which do not bind the conscience under sin, but only under

the duty of submitting to the penalty if it is imposed.*

However, a good citizen will make a point of observing the laws of his country as far as possible. The laws are presumed to be for the public good, and their observance will conduce to the peace and prosperity of the country. They express what is expected of a good citizen, and in order to give good example to others a good citizen will do what is expected of him. He will not be a cause of scandal to others. A natural love for his country will induce a good citizen to observe faithfully the laws of the state, although he knows that for good reasons they are not imposed on him with a strictly moral obligation.

§ 3. Commutative Justice.

Commutative justice, as the name implies, has to do chiefly with buying and selling and other contracts. It regulates relations which exist, or which ought to exist, between different and independent persons, whether physical or moral. It is a matter of commutative justice to observe agreements between nations as well as between individuals. It prescribes that what is due to another as his strict right should be rendered to him. Those who hold an office of any kind are bound by commutative justice to fulfil its duties. Statesmen, judges, magistrates, public, and

* Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, i 57. St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, II–II, q. 186, a. 9.

private servants, lawyers, and doctors sin against commutative justice if they fail to do their duty. They violate an implied or expressed contract entered into when they assumed office.

What must be rendered to another in justice is his due or his strict right. Such rights are of various kinds, both natural and acquired. The right to life, liberty, and proper treatment at the hands of officials are instances of natural rights. A man has a natural right to make things his own, or to acquire private property. Commutative justice recognizes that such a right should be respected. Robbery and theft are against the natural law of justice. Thou shalt not steal is a precept of the natural law.

If commutative justice be violated an injury is done to another, and it is peculiar to such an act that it entails an obligation of making restitution or reparation for the injustice that has been done. This follows from the very nature of commutative justice. When commutative justice is violated, another person is deprived of what belongs to him, of his right. But justice requires that each one should have what belongs to him, and so justice is not done till what he has been deprived of, or its equivalent, is restored to him. This is what is meant by making restitution.

There are two roots of restitution: possession of what belongs to another, and unjust damage of what belongs to another.

If I find a watch I may keep it till I find the owner, but when I have found the owner, I must give him his watch. The watch is his, it belongs to him, and I sin against justice if I do not give another what belongs to him. There is a peculiar connection between the owner and his watch; that connection gives the owner the right to possess his watch; justice demands that the watch should be in the possession of its owner, the watch cries for its owner, just as the child cries for its mother.

If I unjustly destroy or damage what belongs to another, he has not what belongs to him. I must then give him an equivalent. I must put him as far as possible in the possession of the rights of which I unjustly deprived him. I must make restitution to him. Justice demands that, for justice demands that each one should have what belongs to him.

Are prices of commodities a matter of justice, or may a seller get what he can for his goods?

Until quite recent times the answer given to this question was that prices of commodities are certainly a matter of justice, and that a seller who tries to get for his goods more than they are worth is a cheat. At present the question is involved in the greatest confusion, chiefly due to political economists. Some economists merely abstract from the question of justice in prices. Justice, they say, is a matter for ethics, and political economy has nothing to do with ethics. Others assert that prices are regulated by

natural forces as inexorable as those which govern the weather, and so are not subject to the law of justice. The Catholic doctrine is that justice is a moral virtue and that it should rule all men's actions, and therefore his buying and selling, as well as the rest.

Price is the money measure of value, but what is value? We must distinguish carefully between use-value and exchange-value. The use-value of a thing is the advantage which one derives from using it, and the consequent esteem in which he holds it. It is something individualistic, subjective, and variable. The use-value of a glass of water depends on the individual, on his tastes, on his variable needs. Exchange-value is what a thing will exchange for, what the owner can get for it. A glass of water has great or little use-value, according to circumstances; it has no exchange value, because nobody will give anything for it; it can be got for nothing. In order that a thing may have exchange-value, it must be capable of satisfying men's wants, it must be of limited quantity and relatively scarce, and there must be a society of men in existence who have different goods which they are willing to exchange for others. Exchange-value can only exist in society. It is a social product; society gives goods their exchange-value; the social, or common, estimate is the measure of exchange-value. Because it is a social estimate, exchange-value is not mathematically determined. There is a certain indefiniteness about it. In a

given society at a certain time those who are acquainted with the exchange-value of a horse will say on seeing a particular horse: "Oh! he's worth about forty pounds." You might get forty-five pounds for him, but hardly more. You might have to let him go for thirty-five pounds, if you are compelled to sell. In other words, the exchange-value of commodities and consequently their price fluctuates, and even when stable it is not determined to the last penny.

But justice requires that prices should be fair and reasonable. Nobody likes to give more for an article than it is worth, and the common estimate of people acquainted with the state of the market is the measure of its worth. Its use-value to the buyer will be greater than the price which he pays for it, or else he would not part with his money. But justice requires that exchange-values should be equal when things are exchanged in ordinary contracts of buying and selling. That is the doctrine expounded by Aristotle and faithfully adhered to as being the teaching of natural reason until the time of Hobbes and Locke.

Hobbes and Locke denied the traditional teaching without attempting to show that it was false. When the road had thus been cleared, Adam Smith, Ricardo, and other leading economists developed a doctrine of value which was to produce the most important results. They taught that labour is the source and measure of value. Commodities are exchanged according to the amount of labour which

has been put into them. Karl Marx adopted this theory of value and built on it his doctrine of scientific Socialism. He argued that if labour is the source of value, then the worker produces all the wealth of the world. The capitalist pays the worker less for his labour than it is worth and takes the surplus value for himself. Thus the capitalist robs the worker, and no wrong is done by depriving him of his ill-gotten gains.

The doctrine of Karl Marx is the cause of a great deal of the social and economic troubles of our time. It shows how disastrous false teaching may become, and how important it is to keep to the truth.

Labour is, indeed, a source of value, but it is false to say that it is the only source of value or that it is the measure of value. A few examples will make this perfectly clear. There are things of great value which have been acquired without any labour at all, as, for example, a diamond found by chance on the South African veldt. The same quantity of labour often produces commodities of very different values. The faggot maker, the ordinary carpenter, and the cabinet maker may each work for eight hours a day, but the product of their labour will be of very different values. Not unfrequently a workman complains that his labour has been thrown away; he has mixed his labour with the material, but the result is worthless. The Marxian theory of value is false, and the consequences to which it leads are false and disastrous.

§ 4. Distributive Justice.

All citizens can share equally in many of the advantages which the state confers. All have the use of the public highways, of the parks, and all enjoy the security of life and property guaranteed by the laws. But there are some emoluments in the gift of the state which cannot be conferred on all. There are not enough for all, and besides all have not the qualifications necessary. All the citizens of a state cannot be judges, or magistrates, or officers in the army and navy, or hold posts in the civil service. All cannot be raised to the peerage or the baronetage; there must be some to fill the role of ordinary common men and women. There are also public burdens to be borne, and all have not the same capacity to bear them. It would be iniquitous to force all to bear an equal share of taxation in order to meet the costs of government. Yet the emoluments which the state has in its gift, and the burdens which it imposes for the common good belong, in a sense, to all the citizens. The citizens compose the state; what belongs to the state belongs, in a sense, to the citizens. The citizens have a right in justice that common emoluments and common burdens be not distributed among the citizens arbitrarily, according to whim and fancy, or out of favouritism or ill-will. They should be distributed according to the rules of Distributive Justice. What are those rules?

In the first place, those who have the distribution of the common emoluments and burdens should constantly look to the common good in their distribution. Their office obliges them to do this, and explicitly or implicitly they bound themselves to do it when they assumed office. If they fail in this duty they will sin more or less grievously against commutative justice; they will be responsible for all the harm done to society by their wrong distribution, and they will be bound to make restitution for that harm as far as possible.

They should choose only those who are fit for the posts in which they are placed, and among those who are fit they should select those who have the greater claims and the greater merits. In their apportionment of burdens they should look at capacity to bear them, so that the sacrifices which all are compelled to make for the common good should be equal as far as possible. Distributive justice does not proceed according to arithmetical equality, but is proportionate to merits and capacities. This rule can best be illustrated by a few concrete examples.

A ship, *Niagara*, when in danger of foundering was salved by the ship *Tagus*. The judge assigned the sum of five thousand pounds to the officers and crew of the *Tagus* in reward for their services. Of this sum the captain got one thousand pounds, one thousand five hundred pounds were divided among

the officers of the ship, and the rest was divided equally among the crew.

In a certain town the ratepayers contribute a sum of money every year in support of the secondary schools of the district. One or two of the schools are endowed and neither ask for nor receive any assistance from the rates. One or two others are commercial undertakings. They demand high fees for tuition and thus pay all expenses. There are other schools, municipal and voluntary, which give a secondary education to boys and girls of more humble means. Fees are charged, but they are too low to maintain the schools. It is to assist these that the school rate is raised. Distributive justice requires that they should be assisted according to their need, provided that the standard of education given in them reaches a satisfactory level. It would not be just if the municipal schools had all their requirements lavishly supplied, while the voluntary schools suffered from penury and could hardly make ends meet. The voluntary schools do a public service; it is supposed that they do it well, they have a claim in justice to public support, especially as the parents of the pupils contribute their share to the school rate.

If the trustees of a school issue notices of a vacancy in the post of headmaster and announce that they intend to appoint the most suitable candidate, they sin against commutative justice if they fail to do so. They break their contract with the candidates. If

they appoint one who is unfit, they co-operate in the harm which he does. But, unless the school is a state school, they do not sin against distributive justice by appointing one who is less worthy than other candidates, because the appointment is not one of state patronage.

If parliamentary electors send an unfit person to represent them in Parliament, they co-operate in the evil which he does. But they do not sin against distributive justice, for no particular person has a right to represent them; they are free to appoint their own representative, who in a manner acts for them as an agent. The right to vote is theirs; no one has a right to be appointed.

§ 5. Justice and Casuistry.

The Catholic Church is not satisfied with teaching the general principles of Christian morality. She descends to particulars and applies general principles to concrete cases. This is casuistry, and the modern world is strongly prejudiced against casuistry. In this section I will try to explain the grounds of this prejudice and what is the Catholic position. We keep specially in view the principles of justice and their application by casuists to particular and concrete cases.

It is sometimes said that Jesus Christ condemned casuistry. It is quite clear from the Gospel narrative that our Lord did not condemn casuistry, but that

he only condemned bad casuistry. The Pharisees taught that if one took an oath by the Temple at Jerusalem the oath was not binding, but if he swore by the gold on the Temple the oath was binding. Our Lord rejected the distinction. The Temple, he said, sanctified the gold which decorated it, and if an oath by the gold on the Temple was valid and binding, much more was an oath by the Temple valid and binding. The Pharisees taught that tithe must be paid on such insignificant products as mint, anise, and cummin; they neglected to inculcate the weightier matters of the law, judgement and mercy and faith. Our Lord said that they were right in attending to the more trivial obligations of the law, but that they were wrong in neglecting the more important. They did right to strain at gnats, but they should not swallow camels. Pascal is supposed by some to have dealt casuistry its death-blow in his *Provincial Letters*.

Pascal and the *Provincial Letters* cannot be understood without reference to the circumstances of the time. Pascal was a Jansenist and lived and wrote in intimate relations with Arnauld, the leader of the French Jansenists. Jansenism took its rise from the publication of *Augustinus*, a posthumous work written by Jansen, Bishop of Ypres. The book was published in the year 1640; it was condemned by the Holy Office in 1641, and in the following year it was condemned by Pope Urban VIII. The Jan-

senists professed not to know why the book was condemned; they said that it contained the teaching of St Augustine on grace, and that a condemnation of *Augustinus* involved a condemnation of the great Doctor on Grace. Five propositions were extracted from the book and condemned in 1653. Still the Jansenists refused to submit. They acknowledged that the Church is infallible on matters of doctrine, but here was a mere question of fact. They denied, as a matter of fact, that the five propositions were contained in *Augustinus*. However, they realized that the best way to defend oneself is to attack the enemy. The Dominicans and the Jesuits had distinguished themselves in the attack on the Jansenists. The Jansenists determined to retaliate by attacking what they thought were the most vulnerable points in the armour of the Dominicans and Jesuits. Pascal was no theologian, but the Jansenists furnished him with extracts from Dominican and Jesuit writers and told him to make the attack in his own way. The result was the *Provincial Letters*, which began to appear in 1656. The first letters attacked the Dominican doctrine on Grace, but the matter was abstruse and difficult, and the *Letters* failed to attract much attention. From the fifth letter onwards Pascal professed to attack the moral theology of the Society of Jesus. The matter was more popular and intelligible, and the wit and style of the writer at once secured a wide hearing. The *Letters* were imme-

diately condemned by both ecclesiastical and civil authorities.

The extracts on which Pascal based his attack were often carefully worded and strictly guarded propositions on delicate points of moral conduct. The mere taking of them from their context unduly extended and altered their meaning, especially when important words were omitted, as was sometimes the case. Pascal accused the Jesuits of teaching that the end justifies the means, a calumny which has often been repeated but never proved to be true. The proposition is rank heresy, as Vasquez, a great Jesuit theologian, expressly teaches.

Pascal professed to attack the lax moral teaching of the Jesuits, but of the three typical authors whom he quotes most frequently, Diana, Pontius, and Bauny, only the last was a Jesuit. Diana was a Theatine, and Pontius an Augustinian. Bauny was indeed a Jesuit, but he was not looked upon as a great theologian of the Society. His popular French book, *Somme des Péchés* had been condemned by the Holy Office at Rome in 1640.

The Society has no moral theology of its own. Its theologians have ever professed to teach the morality of the Catholic Church. Like the theologians of other Orders, some of the theologians of the Society have inclined to the side of rigour in morals, while others have in general followed milder opinions. It is a gratuitous insult on the part of

Pascal to attribute this very natural phenomenon to deliberate policy adopted in order to gain influence with all, both rigorists and laxists.

Modern writers often base their objections against casuistry on more fundamental grounds. They say that it attempts to do what is impossible. Casuistry tries to draw up rules for the regulation of every human action. It is baffled by the infinite complexity of human life and its ever-changing circumstances.

Casuists are well aware of the infinite complexity of human life; they know well that the circumstances of human action are constantly changing and that all the circumstances of any future action cannot be foreseen. Still they hold that rules for human action can be framed so that anyone by their aid can discover whether any particular action which he contemplates is right or wrong. To discover this it is not necessary to attend to all the circumstances of the action, but only to those that are relevant. Rules for these relevant circumstances have been drawn up by moralists of all ages and of all schools. With a sound judgement and an honest purpose they can be applied to most concrete cases without great difficulty. Occasionally it is true a difficult moral case will occur, but even then a good moralist will be able to find a practical solution. There is no greater difficulty in morals arising from the infinite variety of human life than there is in mathematics. Future problems

in arithmetic cannot be foreseen in all their details, but this does not prevent a solution being reached by one who knows his principles of arithmetic, and by practice in examples has learnt how to apply them correctly.

A modern theory which underlies a good deal of the prejudice against casuistry is what is called independent morality. According to this theory man is a law to himself; there are no objective rules of morality which are obligatory on man. It is the height of impertinence for anyone to formulate rules of moral conduct and try to impose them on others.

This attitude is irrational and un-christian. It is irrational, for reason and experience teach us that man is subject to certain moral laws which he violates at his peril and to his ruin. If a man persists in over-indulging his appetites or selfishness he is sure to pay for it dearly. It is un-christian, for Jesus Christ proclaimed the necessity of observing the commandments if we would be followers of him. Those commandments are not mere abstract and theoretical propositions. They are practical rules of conduct, which can be applied to the concrete cases of everyday life without much difficulty. Human life in accordance with them is quite possible, and it is quite easy to know when they are violated. Children of eight or nine know quite well when they break them, and which of them is broken by theft or disobedience.

One who wishes to lead an honest life cannot escape casuistry. He must act with a good conscience, or in other words he must perform every deliberate action with the conviction that he is doing right. He can only do this by realizing that his action is in conformity with the moral law. Such a judgement must at least implicitly precede every deliberate action, and such a judgement is an application of moral principles to concrete cases, or it is casuistry. Is it safe to leave the judgement to each individual as the cases arise, or is it safer to trust such work to the expert? The Catholic Church is not the only authority which holds that such work can only be done safely by the expert. Self-interest warps the judgement, and many questions in ethics, and especially in matters of justice, are difficult. Even able men, specially trained to treat such subjects, will often hold different opinions on particular points. The Stoics were highly esteemed for their ethical teaching, a branch of philosophy which they cultivated with care. In his work *On Duties*, Cicero gives some interesting examples of moral questions concerning justice which were discussed by them. There was a scarcity of provisions in the island of Rhodes, and the price of corn was high. A certain corn merchant had secret information that large supplies were not far off and would shortly arrive. Might he keep his information to himself and continue to sell his corn at famine prices? Another case was that of a man who had

an insanitary house for sale. Was he obliged to tell all its defects to intending buyers?

Cicero tells us that the Stoic philosopher, Diogenes, took the more lenient view in both cases, while his pupil Antipater took the stricter. From the schools of the Stoics the two cases passed into those of the Catholic Church, where they are discussed to this day. Both St Thomas Aquinas and St Alphonsus discuss them, and we shall do better to follow their solution than that of the interested corn merchant or owner of insanitary property.

CHAPTER XI

PRICES MORALIZED

SOME progress has of late been made in the direction of moralizing wages. A still wider and more important question is the moralizing of prices. The practice of too many traders in all ages has always been to neglect ethical rules in business and get as much as they could for their wares. It is a peculiarity of recent times to deny that business is subject to ethical rules. We may take Mr. Joseph, Fellow and Tutor at Oxford, as an exponent of these modern economic views. In a recent book he tells us that economic value is a matter of economics, not of ethics. A bargain is settled on terms agreed on between buyer and seller. The buyer wants a commodity, the seller wants money. The buyer is prepared to give money for the commodity in proportion to the urgency of his want of it. One buyer wants the commodity more, another buyer wants it less, and the want of the same buyer varies at different times. A buyer who experiences a keener want is ready to give more money for what will satisfy his want. This is neither right nor wrong, it is neither just nor unjust, it is simply inevitable. It has no

more to do with ethics and morality than the failure of the monsoon in India. A price is not unjust where no rule that it infringes can be produced. And in the absence of definite agreements and enactments we can produce no rule of universal application to which prices ought to conform.

That is the contention. Is it true? Mr. Joseph applies it to the wages of labour as well as to the price of commodities. We restrict ourselves here to the latter question.

It is certainly a question of economics. Economics are concerned with the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities. But it is also a question of morals, for the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities are human actions, and all human actions are subject to the moral law. It is possible to produce, distribute, and consume commodities, rightly or wrongly, and the moral law prescribes that those actions should be done rightly. Whether you eat or drink or whatever else you do, do all to the glory of God, says St Paul, and he is merely teaching a precept of natural ethics. All deliberate human action must be conformed to the supreme rule of all moral action; it must be conformed to the end of human existence and of human life.

But is there any definite rule of morality which tells us when buying and selling are conformed or not to the end of all human action? St Thomas and Catholic theologians answer this question in the

affirmative, and their arguments show that they rest their conclusion on the law of right reason and nature. They use the arguments of Aristotle, Cicero, and other non-christian writers, and they confirm them by the teaching of Holy Scripture. I will try to state the Catholic doctrine as concisely as I can. A society is necessary in order that exchange of commodities may take place. Robinson Crusoe in his solitude had to satisfy his wants as far as he could by his own labour. He had to make his own clothes, obtain his own food, build his own hut. But when a number of families are grouped together the advantages derived from division of labour become apparent. One man takes to making clothes, another becomes the carpenter, another the smith, another an agriculturist, and so on. Money is soon invented and commerce arises. The different members of the society produce commodities not only for their own consumption, but for others. By exchanging their productions for those of others or by buying and selling they can satisfy their various wants. They produce with a view to this. They know beforehand what they can get for a garment, or a knife, or a measure of milk. The value of every commodity which is bought and sold is put on it by the community. What the fair and reasonable price of all that is bought and sold may be is matter of common estimation and common knowledge. This is a fact of experience and it is not limited to primitive village communities. It is

valid for the complicated circumstances of modern English commercial life.

According to the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, if the price of what has been sold is not otherwise determined, the buyer must pay a reasonable price, obviously implying that it is not difficult to determine what a reasonable price is. The same was clearly implied by the Profiteering Act of 1919. Society, then, makes the buying and selling of commodities possible; moreover, it is the social estimate which gives commodities their exchange-value, and the social estimate is the measure of that exchange-value. The course of reasoning, indicated above, by which Mr. Joseph, like other modern economists, strives to settle the question of exchange-value, is beside the mark. It discusses the matter as if it concerned individual buyers and sellers, and comes to the conclusion that price is subjective and individualistic, whereas it is social in its origin, and depends on a social estimate for its very existence and measure. Every commodity, then, that is commonly bought and sold has a more or less definite exchange-value or price, and this is given to it, is put upon it by the common estimate in the place, time, and other circumstances of the sale.

Now, justice demands that everyone should have what belongs to him or its equivalent. And so in the contract of buying and selling justice requires that after the contract the parties should have the

same exchange-values as they had before. Both, indeed, gain in usefulness from the contract. If a man buys a spade for ten shillings he does so because the spade will be of more use to him than the money. He gains, therefore, in use-value, but if he has not paid an unjust price for the spade he has the same exchange-value as before. This distinction is made by Aristotle, and it is fundamental in the whole question. It is lost sight of by Mr. Joseph and by other modern economists in their discussion of this question. The price, then, of commodities is not something arbitrary, subjective, and individualistic. It is fixed within certain limits, objective because social and not individualistic. Buying and selling, therefore, though a matter of economics, is also a matter of ethics, it is subject to the law of justice. St Thomas teaches that it is also subject to the law of charity. The law of charity to our neighbour is summed up in the maxim—Do to others as you would be done by. The rule was well known to the ethical writers of antiquity, and it is enunciated in the Old and New Testament. It is a fundamental rule of natural morality. Nobody likes, as a general rule, to give more for a commodity than it is worth. Do, then, as you would be done by, and do not sell a commodity for more than it is worth according to the common estimate.

There is, then, a fair, reasonable, and just price for things which are commonly bought and sold.

Justice and charity are violated by demanding more or giving less than the just price. We should all be better, happier, and more contented if this moral rule were more strictly observed than it is in modern business relations.

CHAPTER XII

THE TAXATION OF BETTING

GREAT excitement some time since was caused by the Government's proposal to tax betting transactions. Mr. Snowden denounced it in the House of Commons, several Nonconformist religious bodies have declared that they are opposed to it, and even some sections of the Church of England have raised their voice against it. The chief objection against the proposal, and the only one which concerns us here, is that the proposed taxation would be against sound morality. A writer in the *Guardian* acknowledged that it was difficult to draw the line between a bet which is harmless and gambling which is ruinous, but he would have the moralist decline to attempt to draw such a line; he quoted Pascal to the effect that the heart has reasons of which the intellect knows nothing.

But, surely, if we want sound ethics we must appeal to reason and not to sentiment. It is often difficult to draw the line between what is right and what is wrong, but there is no other way of obtaining a code of rational morality. All right rules of conduct are a mean between two vicious extremes. The right

use of money is the mean between stinginess and extravagance, and so with all virtues except divine charity. Divine charity is the end of all virtue; it is the measure of all virtue, and we cannot have too much of it. But of all other virtues we may have too much as well as too little, and so if we want to have moral rules for the guidance of our conduct, we must necessarily draw the line, separate what is defective from what is excessive, and thus define what is right and what is wrong.

Betting is not necessarily wrong. A man intends to go on a short holiday at the week-end. On Friday morning he says to a friend: "I think it will be a fine day to-morrow." The friend prides himself on being weather-wise and he answers: "I'll bet you a shilling that it will rain." "Done," said the other "I'll take your bet." Few people would maintain that such a bet as this is morally wrong. We suppose that both parties can spare a shilling, that both intend to pay if they lose, that nobody suffers in consequence of the bet. As one might give the other a shilling as a present if he chose, so he may pay a shilling to the other according to agreement, because he was wrong in his forecast of the weather.

But, as everybody knows, betting is liable to abuse. Money may be staked of which the bettor has not the free disposal, or more than he can afford. If he loses his bet he may be ruined, or he may be sorely tempted to commit theft or fraud in order to get wherewith

to pay. Frequent betting becomes gambling, and a very dangerous habit is formed. Gambling encourages idleness, leads people into bad company, and very frequently ends in ruin. Gambling, then, or playing for high stakes, is usually wrong for one reason or another. In other words, betting may be unobjectionable from the point of view of morality if it is indulged in sparingly and under certain conditions. It may be compared to drinking intoxicating liquor. It is not wrong to drink a glass or two of beer or wine if you can afford it; it is wrong to drink to excess or more than you can afford to pay for. It was necessary to try to get clear notions about the morality of betting before going on to consider the question of the morality of the taxation of betting. The two questions are connected, but they are not identical. With regard to an institution which is certainly immoral I can well imagine a most moral Government saying to itself: "I cannot suppress you; if I attempted to do so I should probably do more harm than good. But I know that you are making a great deal of money. I will tax you, and that, at any rate, will have the good effect of diminishing your profits, and preventing others, perhaps, from imitating your example, induced thereto by the hope of realizing the excessive profits which you realize at present."

Is there, then, anything objectionable, from the point of view of sound morality, to the proposal of

the Government to tax betting transactions? I cannot see that there is anything objectionable to the proposal. As to the assertion of Mr. Snowden that the proposed tax would patronize, legalize, and make respectable one of the greatest curses of the country, I must say that I fail to see it. After all, to tax a man is hardly to patronize him or make him respectable. Such an argument may come well enough from His Majesty's Opposition in the House of Commons, but it hardly produces conviction when it is read calmly in the quiet atmosphere of one's room. The taxation of intoxicating liquor offers a complete parallel. In the case of intoxicating liquor, taxation does not patronize or legalize drunkenness, or make it respectable; how, then, could taxation patronize or legalize gambling, or make it respectable? Without qualms of conscience on the part of the most scrupulous, the Government obtains a large annual revenue from the taxation of intoxicating liquor; why should it not endeavour to raise a little money by the taxation of betting? Drinking intoxicating liquor is a luxury, and so is betting.

CHAPTER XIII

CHRISTIAN PATRIOTISM

AFTER more than a century of struggle and revolution the principle of Nationalism has prevailed—at least, to a great extent. Oppressed nationalities have succeeded to a great extent in securing the freedom and the home rule which they demanded. And yet peace and contentment do not seem to have come together with the realization of the nations' hopes. Far-seeing men are beginning to fear that a new element of discord and war has been introduced into Europe. Some nations find themselves cooped up within the limits of the lands of their ancestors with frontiers that have no pretension to be scientific. On the other side of their frontiers are hostile and aggressive peoples who seriously threaten their security. In pure self-defence they must make their security more certain. Others find themselves cut off from easy access to the sea, and their commerce with the outside world controlled by jealous neighbours. The more powerful nations are fully conscious of their own superiority. They show little disposition to adopt a self-denying ordinance, and refrain from using their economic and political

advantages for their own benefit. On the contrary, they seem determined to take advantage of their opportunities to the full. The watchword of "Germany above all" has not been silenced even though it is uttered in less boisterous tone than was usual before the Great War. National pride and ambition is one of the strongest passions of human nature, and it has not been exorcised by any means as yet.

On the contrary, the old spirit of imperial Rome seems to be as strong as ever in some modern peoples. According to the national poet it was the proud mission of Rome to rule the subject nations with imperial sway, to spare those who submitted, and to war down those who obstinately resisted. This, of course, was for the benefit of less cultured nations. Roman culture and Roman peace were blessings which the outer barbarian should be compelled to accept for his own good.

The fervour and the absolute character of pagan patriotism added strength to this imperial temper. In his work on *Duties*, Cicero tells us what pagan patriotism was. "When we have gone over," he says, "all the relations that are in the world, and thoroughly considered the nature of each, we shall find that there is no one of greater obligation, no one that is dearer and nearer to us than that which all of us bear to the commonwealth. We have a tender regard and concern for our parents, for our children, our kindred

and acquaintance, but the love which we have for our native country swallows up all other loves whatsoever." The ancients deified and worshipped their country, and the ancient state domineered with absolute power over both soul and body. There is not much tendency nowadays to pay religious worship to the state, but in other respects in many quarters a recrudescence of the pagan doctrine of patriotism may be observed.

This recrudescence of pagan patriotism is all the more dangerous because it is untrammelled by any laws of morality. The ancient state professed to be scrupulously observant of the laws of justice and fidelity. The modern state adopts the principles of Machiavelli; it acknowledges only one law, the law of success. The watchword, "Germany over all," is not confined to Germany; some in England change it to "England over all," and they add another to it, "England, right or wrong." A powerful state, fettered by no laws, human or divine, treating its pledged word as only a scrap of paper, commanding the blind obedience of its subjects, becomes a menace to the world.

While some exaggerate the duty of patriotism, there are others who minimize or deny it altogether. They profess to be cosmopolitans, citizens of the world, or they are Internationals. The Red International of Communism fosters loyalty to class rather than to country. The yellow International of high finance

pursues its object of gain irrespective of country; it is prepared to assist the fatherland in difficulties, but on strictly business principles. Many people who belong neither to the red nor to the yellow International deny that patriotism is a virtue. In their opinion it is a mere prejudice, a provincialism, a sort of extended selfishness. The true attitude according to them is to cultivate esteem and friendship for all mankind, and to recognize the good points in all men. Some Catholics even regard patriotism as rather a pagan virtue. The true Catholic, they think, considers heaven as his true fatherland, and looks upon his home on earth as a place of exile and a vale of tears. Are we not exhorted to conduct ourselves here below as strangers and pilgrims? Is not human life a journey through the desert of this world towards the promised land? All this suggests that patriotism is a matter of practical importance, and that it is not without its ambiguities and difficulties. It will be worth while to try to state the Catholic doctrine on the subject as clearly and concisely as possible. We shall find that patriotism is recognized as a virtue by Catholic theology, and that, like all moral virtues, it occupies a mean position between two vicious extremes.

Although it may be said that patriotism is nowhere explicitly inculcated as a virtue in Holy Scripture, yet there are many passages and incidents where it is implied. The book of Esther and the books of

the Machabees abound in such passages. One of the tenderest and most touching of the Psalms is the hundred and thirty-sixth: "How shall we sing the song of the Lord in a strange land? If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand be forgotten. Let my tongue cleave to my jaws if I do not remember thee." One of the most pathetic incidents in the Gospels is our Lord's weeping over Jerusalem. So that if we are taught that heaven is our true spiritual country, and are bidden to conduct ourselves on earth as exiles, this does not mean that we have no duties to our earthly country while we live here.

St Ambrose, St Augustine, and St Thomas, in the name of the Church, expressly teach that patriotism is a virtue implanted in us by Nature herself and inculcated by the religion of Christ. It is a part of the two fundamental virtues of justice and charity. Justice requires that we should give everyone his due, that we should pay to all what we owe them. There is no one to whom we owe more than to God, our Creator and Lord. To him we owe all that we have, all that we are, and all that we hope to be. We depend upon him every moment of our existence. We cannot repay him the immense debt that we owe him, but justice compels us to do what we can. We strive to do this by practising the virtue of religion, by giving God the love, honour, and worship which pleases him and which is his due.

Under God we owe most to our parents. They

brought us into the world, and gave us the first and most important part of our education. We inherited from our parents a certain habit of body, certain tendencies, and certain dispositions, and those dispositions were developed and stereotyped during our early years, when we were under the more immediate control of our parents. Our characters for good or evil were moulded to a great extent before we began to think, and they were moulded largely by our parents and by the home which they provided for us. To our parents we owe the education which was intended to fit us for the battle of life. It is our duty to strive to repay all the debt which we owe to our parents by honouring them, by loving, reverencing, and obeying them as long as we are not emancipated from their control. Our duty towards them of love and reverence lasts as long as life.

Under God and our parents we owe most to the country in which we were born and bred. Our country gave us the food, drink, clothing, air, and exercise which our bodies required. Our characters, ideas, feelings, sentiments, aims, and ambitions are to a great extent inherited from the race to which we belong, and are the product of its character, its history, and its traditions. The very hills and valleys, the woods and the rivers of our native land, have left their mark upon us. We should have been quite different beings if we had been born and brought up in Spain or in India.

That immense debt which we owe to our country we pay by practising the virtue of patriotism. We are bound to esteem and love our country and to serve it to the best of our ability in its needs. This does not mean that we are to hate other countries. Just as the love of our parents does not imply that we should hate the parents of other people, so the duty of loving our country does not imply that we should hate other countries. We fully recognize that other people have their obligations towards their parents; we prefer our own. In the same way we recognize the duty and the right of other people to love their country; we prefer our own.

In the second place, patriotism is based on the great virtue of charity. Our Lord was only announcing what the natural law prescribes when he said that all morality hangs on the two fundamental precepts of the love of God and the love of our neighbour as ourselves. The duty of loving our neighbour as ourselves, of doing as we would be done by, does not mean that we are to entertain the same evenly balanced affection for all men. We must love other men inasmuch as they are our neighbours. We must wish well to the Chinese and the Japanese whom we do not know and shall never see. Our fellow-countrymen are much nearer to us than the Chinese and Japanese; they are our neighbours in a stricter sense, and well-ordered charity takes note of the fact. Their interests and welfare are intimately bound up

with ours. We need their help, protection, and good will in a thousand different ways. We are members of the same organized body politic, of the same community, and St Paul tells us that one member cannot say to another: "I need you not."

There is, then, an obligation made known to us by right reason, and enforced by Christian charity, of loving our fellow-countrymen and fellow-citizens with a special degree of affection. The instructed Catholic will not be exposed to the danger of exaggerating this obligation and making it supreme and absolute over all other duties. He knows that he is a member of a still greater communion of saints, to whom also he is bound by special ties in this life and in life everlasting. He must do nothing to imperil his claim to life everlasting, even under the excuse of patriotism. Such a maxim as " England, right or wrong " is self-condemned in his eyes. And so the true Catholic's patriotism is real and genuine, but it is not exaggerated. It occupies the golden mean between two vicious extremes. The country which, as true patriots, we are bound to esteem, love, and serve is in general our native land, the country in which we were born and bred. That is clear from what has just been said about justice and charity, the foundations of patriotism.

But in these days of emigration the case frequently arises of a man leaving his native land and making a home for himself and his children elsewhere. An

Englishman, for example, emigrates to America, with a view to settling there. He will preserve a warm affection for the old country, he may visit it occasionally, but he has made his home in America, and henceforth he will regard America with a true patriot's esteem and love. That, too, is a conclusion drawn from justice and charity.

CHAPTER XIV

ACTION FOR BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE

SOME of the commentators on the new Code of Canon Law are in grave difficulties over the right interpretation of Canon 1017. It is laid down in that Canon that no other engagements to marry are valid but those that are in writing signed by the parties themselves and by the parish priest or the local Ordinary or two witnesses. The Canon, furthermore, provides that there lies no action in the ecclesiastical courts for breach of promise of marriage, even when the contract was expressed in writing, duly signed, and there was no good reason for breaking it off. All that is conceded to the aggrieved party is an action for damages if there were any. The difficulty is further increased by an answer to a question proposed to the Pontifical Commission for the interpretation of the Code. The case was put of a man who was going to marry a third party although he had been previously engaged to another girl, and it was asked whether, if this girl brought an action against him for damages, the celebration of marriage with the third party would be suspended till the issue of the trial was determined. The answer was that

no action lay for the investigation of the question whether the breach of promise was justified or not, and that the celebration of the marriage with the third party would not be suspended by the trial of the action for damages.

The law of the Church as thus stated gives rise to some practical difficulties. Let us suppose that a parish priest is asked to publish the banns of marriage between two of his parishioners, A and B. On the banns being published a girl, C, comes to the parish priest and shows a written engagement to marry duly signed by A and herself and two witnesses. Let us suppose that the parish priest knows all the circumstances of the case out of confession and that A has no good reason for violating his engagement with C. Nevertheless, he must tell C that she has no remedy, that she may claim damages if she likes, but that such a claim cannot suspend or delay the marriage of A and B. The contract between A and C was valid, and produced a grave obligation in justice to fulfil it, nor has A any good reason for violating it. If A goes to confession to the parish priest the parish priest must refuse him absolution, for he is guilty of a grave sin and is unrepentant. But outside the confessional he is obliged to publish the banns of marriage between A and B, nor can the celebration of the marriage be deferred in consequence of the just complaints of C. Is not the Church bound to uphold the moral law and protect the rights of the innocent?

If it is put in that way the difficulty can be made to look formidable enough. But we must look at the question from other points of view.

Perfect liberty of marriage is a matter of great importance for the public good. A marriage into which one of the parties has been forced can scarcely turn out well. No one should be forced to marry against his will. The laws of many modern states refuse to grant actions at law for breach of promise of marriage. The Church's legislation in this matter is apparently suggested by the similar laws of those modern states. For motives concerning the public good the Church refuses to force anyone to marry against his will. She is justified in doing that, even though occasionally the rights of individuals are not vindicated in consequence. Private advantage must yield to the demands of the public welfare. When the engagement was entered into the provisions of the law were known, the parties knew that the law granted no redress for any failure to fulfil the contract, and the contract was made with that knowledge in the minds of both parties to it. They cannot, then, complain that an injustice is done them by the law when it merely denies a right of action to enforce the contract. To refuse to help a party to protect his rights is not to deny or abrogate his rights. Public authorities are not bound to protect all the rights of their subjects.

English law refuses to grant an action at law for the

recovery of a debt barred by lapse of time. The law does not extinguish the debt when six years have elapsed from the time when payment became due. It regards the debt as still owing. It will support the action of a creditor who appropriates to the payment of a debt barred by lapse of time an unappropriated payment made by the debtor. An executor creditor may pay himself a debt barred by lapse of time, and the law will uphold him. So that laws which deny an action for the protection of a right do not of themselves take away the right, they leave it where they found it; it remains a right of natural obligation. They are not unjust laws if they are enacted on account of grave reasons connected with the public welfare. If, according to the laws of the Church, two parties are free to marry, their parish priest is bound to assist at their marriage; no option is given him. He may know that one or both of the parties are in a state of sin and unrepentant, and therefore unfit to receive absolution. He will do what he can to put them in better dispositions, but if he does not succeed in his endeavour he must nevertheless assist at the marriage. Otherwise he would not do his duty as parish priest and authoritative witness of the marriage on behalf of the Church.

I think that these considerations explain and justify Canon 1017, and show that there is no real conflict between the parish priest's duties as a confessor and as the Church's witness of marriage.

CHAPTER XV

CATHOLICISM AND ANGLO-CATHOLICISM

BEFORE Jesus Christ came on earth religion was a national institution. The religion of the Egyptians, Persians, Babylonians, Greeks, and Romans was national; they all worshipped the national gods in the national way. Even the Jewish religion was national, but, according to many a glowing passage of the Old Testament, a great change was to take place in this respect when the Messias came. He would establish a universal kingdom, he would rule from sea to sea and from the river unto the ends of the earth; all kings would adore him, and all the nations of the earth would serve him. Jesus Christ himself foretold that his Gospel was to be preached in the whole world, that they would come from the east and the west and from the north and the south and sit down in the kingdom of God, and that penance and remission of sins would be preached to all nations. In his final charge to his Apostles he commanded them to teach all nations, to make disciples of all nations, to preach the Gospel to every creature. All that believed and were baptized would be saved. The Apostles were to be witnesses unto him even to

the uttermost part of the earth. And so the middle wall of partition was broken down; the religion of Jesus Christ was not a national religion: it was a religion for all mankind; it was a universal, a Catholic religion.

Catholicity, then, was always a distinguishing mark of the Church founded by Jesus Christ. Christians were taught from the beginning to profess their faith in the Catholic Church. When heresies and schisms arose they were easily distinguished from the Church founded by Jesus Christ. They were particular, sectional: she was universal, Catholic. Schisms and sects were given the name of their founder; they were Donatist, Arian; or they took their name from some doctrine which they preached, like the Monophysites; or from the country where they lived, like the Cataphrygians: the Church founded by Jesus Christ was simply the universal, the Catholic Church. All through history it has been the same. In the sixteenth century Lutherans, Calvinists, Protestants separated from the Church, which always remained simply Catholic. Sometimes a sect would give itself the name of Catholic and Apostolic, but the world insisted on calling it Irvingite. When the Eastern Church went into schism it maintained that it was the whole Catholic Church, but still it called itself and was called by others the Orthodox Church. When Henry VIII and Elizabeth set up a new form of religion in England, it became known as the Church

of England. An active section of the Church of England calls itself Catholic, and it would give much if it could induce others to do the same, but the most that the world will concede to them is to call them Anglo-Catholics. The simple name of Catholic is reserved for the old, historic, universal Church founded by Jesus Christ.

In the past, Anglo-Catholics have frequently protested against "the exclusive and arrogant usurpation of the name Catholic by the Church of Rome." The last to do so was Bishop Gore, who devoted to this theme a course of sermons delivered in the Grosvenor Chapel, Mayfair, London. Father F. Woodlock, S.J., answered him in a course preached at Farm Street. This course has been published by Longmans with the title *Constantinople, Canterbury, and Rome*. Father Woodlock has no difficulty in showing that the Bishop is neither Catholic nor consistent. The Catholic doctrine about the Church is quite clear and precise, and it is founded on the teaching of our Lord himself. The Church is the pillar and ground of truth. As the Apostles and their successors were commanded to teach all the truths contained in the Gospel, so all who heard them were commanded, under pain of damnation, to believe all that the Apostles and their successors taught. He would guarantee their teaching; he would be with them in their teaching to the end of time; the powers of evil and of falsehood should never prevail against

his Church. Those who heard their preaching heard him; those who despised them despised him and the Father who sent him. If anyone refused to hear the Church and preferred his own private judgement, he was to be treated as a heathen and a publican.

This is very different from Dr. Gore's teaching. According to him there is no security that the Church of the New Covenant may not go wrong as the Church of the Old Covenant went wrong. Again and again the evidence shows that it has done so, he says. Throughout life it has been a principle with him that "to accept ecclesiastical authority in the face of the best judgement of his own reason would be an impossible treason against light." That is not Catholic doctrine; it is not even orthodox Protestantism: it is flat rationalism. Bishop Gore claims the right to follow his own private judgement against the judgement of the Church, but if any of his hearers ventures to follow his own private judgement against that of some Anglo-Catholic leaders, he threatens them with the judgement of Christ!

One of the plainest things in the New Testament is that Jesus Christ taught with authority and required in his hearers absolute faith in and submission to his teaching. If any teacher was ever authoritative and dogmatic, Jesus Christ was. And yet Dr. Gore, who claims to be a Christian Bishop, and who undoubtedly is an able man, tells us that Christ "plainly desired that every man should think for himself"; that he

"was strangely adverse to the dogmatic method," and that according to Christ "mere submission to dogmatic authority" was a spirit to be discouraged. Truth to say, Catholicism and Anglo-Catholicism are poles apart even on first principles.

CHAPTER XVI

REUNION

THIRTY years ago Pope Leo XIII issued his beautiful Encyclical Letter on the Reunion of Christendom. He invited the separated Churches of the East, the Russian Church, and the Protestant Churches of the West to form again one fold under one Shepherd, and thus fulfil the prayer and the will of Christ. He protested that it was no love of domination but a pure sense of duty as Pope which urged him to make this appeal. Later on the annual novena of prayer before Whitsuntide was enjoined on the faithful throughout the world for the same intention. More recently still a petition for the reunion of Christendom was added to the Litany of the Saints. These and other measures have had their effect on the Christian world. Some years ago it was calculated that in response to Pope Leo's letter at least one hundred thousand Eastern schismatics had come back to the Church. During the same period many distinguished converts have joined the Church in America and in England. For some years past a strong movement towards reunion has been gaining ground in England. In 1920 the Conference of

Anglican Bishops who met at Lambeth issued their "Appeal to all Christian People" in favour of reunion. As is well known, since then certain informal conversations between Catholics and Anglicans have been held at Malines in Belgium, and more formal conferences at Lambeth between representatives of the Church of England and representatives of the Evangelical Free Churches. In 1922 a committee of six Anglicans and six Evangelicals was elected to meet under the presidency of the Archbishop of York, to report on certain fundamental questions of principle which had become prominent in the discussions of the Joint Conference. Those fundamental questions were (*a*) the nature of the Church, (*b*) the nature of the ministry, and (*c*) the place of Creeds in a united Church. The report was duly drawn up in a series of short propositions, and it was accepted by the Conference. It has been published by the S.P.C.K., with the authority of the Anglican Archbishops and of the Moderator of the Federal Council of the Evangelical Free Churches. We may, then, take these propositions as embodying the belief of representative Anglican and Nonconformist divines of to-day on the important questions with which they deal. In the first place, we are chiefly interested in the propositions which describe the nature of the Church. Reunion is impossible until clear and sound notions on that all-important subject are held by all parties concerned. Discussion will

help towards this end, so I propose to state some of my own views on the propositions of the Report concerning the nature of the Church of Christ.

According to the Report, the Church has not been instituted by men: it is a creation of God. It consists of members who have passed out of this world and of others who are still living in this world, "but it has its expression in this world in a visible form." "This visible Church was instituted by Christ as a fellowship of men"; it is "an ordered society here on earth."

Here a Catholic must pause and put a question for which there is no answer in the Report. If the Church has a visible form in this world, if it is a fellowship of men and an ordered society, and Christ himself thus instituted it, then it must have a visible head. Christ, of course, is the supreme head of all the Churches in heaven and on earth, but he is invisible. All visible societies of men require a visible head. No ordered society can exist without one. Where is the visible head of the visible society which we call the Church of Christ?

The Report teaches that the Church is the Body of Christ, and as there is only one and can only be one Christ, so there is one and can only be one Church. Men become members of the Church by baptism. The Church visible on earth ought to express and manifest the one life of the one Body by its own visible unity. This it did in New Testament

days. But now "there are different and even rival denominational Churches independent of each other," and at least "temporarily separated" from each other.

But, we ask, how can these different rival, independent, and separated Churches make one visible Church of Christ?

The answer of the Report is that these separate and independent Churches, in as far as they have the marks which ought to characterize the Church visible on earth, are parts of that one Church of Christ. But they possess those marks in very varying degrees of completeness or defect. "Some, indeed, may be so defective that they cannot rightly be judged to be parts of that Church."

To this Catholics would object that many different, rival, independent, and separated societies cannot possibly make one society, nor can many different, rival, independent, and separated societies be parts of one society. You may put together a quarter of an apple, a quarter of a pear, a quarter of an orange, and a quarter of a plum, but these four parts do not make one fruit. They remain four quarters of four different fruits. Moreover, Christ gave marks to the visible Church which he founded in order to distinguish it from other bodies which were not his Church. It is very true that those marks are not possessed by some Churches which call themselves Christian, and we need only use our eyes and common

sense to see it. "But such judgements," says the Report, somewhat cryptically, "are limited to the sphere of the visible Church on earth; it would be presumption to claim that they are valid for the whole Church of Christ!"

Let us dwell a little on this fundamental question of the marks of the true Church of Jesus Christ.

The Lambeth Conference Report says very truly that as the Church of Christ on earth is a visible Church, it must possess certain visible and recognizable marks whereby it can be seen and known by men. Christ took care that his Church should be readily distinguishable from other societies which were not his Church but which would lay claim to the honour, as he well foreknew. According to English law, genuine gold and silver plate must be stamped with a hall-mark, so that buyers may not be cheated. Christ impressed his marks on the Church which he founded, so that no synagogue of Satan could be mistaken for it. In order that such a mark may fulfil its function, it must be more easily recognizable than that which it makes visible. Hence it will not do to say that the preaching of the true faith is a mark of the Church of Christ. We know the true faith from the preaching of the true Church of Christ; we do not know the Church of Christ from the preaching of the faith. Moreover, if a mark is to serve its purpose, it must be a really distinguishing mark, not something which is common to all the objects concerned. If I

want someone who does not know him to distinguish John from Thomas and Andrew, I must not tell him that John has two arms and two legs, when those marks are common to all three.

Moreover, the marks which Christ gave to his Church so that it might be a city set on a hill and clearly visible from all the country round have been known and named from the earliest times. Two were expressly inserted in the Apostles' Creed. Besides the Jewish synagogue there were heretical conventicles almost from the beginning. Catholicity or universality was a feature which was quite conspicuous and one which clearly distinguished the Church of Christ from the synagogue and from the local conventicles of the heretics. Not less clearly did the note of Holiness distinguish the Church of Christ from the Pharisaism of the synagogue and the licentiousness of the early heresies. Oneness and Apostolicity were, of course, marks of the Church from the beginning, but they were expressly added to the other two during the fourth century, when all four were regularly repeated in what we call the Nicene Creed. Christians of East and West continued for centuries to profess their faith in the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church. Theologians differed in their enumeration of the marks of the true Church of Christ. Some reckoned only two, others three, others, again, six, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve. Bellarmine gives fifteen, among them being

Antiquity and Indefectibility, but he acknowledges that they can all be reduced to the common four of the Nicene Creed if anyone prefers that number.

Luther taught that the marks of the true Church were these seven: The true and uncorrupt preaching of the Gospel; the lawful administration of Baptism; the lawful administration of the Eucharist; the lawful use of the keys; the lawful election of ministers to preach and administer the Sacraments; public prayer, psalmody, and catechism in a language that could be understood by the people; and the mystery of the Cross, or the bearing of persecution and suffering for the sake of justice. Bellarmine observes that Luther was careful not to mention the marks of the true Church which were assigned by the Nicene Creed and solemnly reaffirmed by many General Councils of the Church. The Church which Luther set up was neither One, nor Holy, nor Catholic, nor Apostolic. Luther knew this as well as anybody else, and so, as Bellarmine remarks, he said nothing about the marks of the true Church, even though they were taught by the Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed. He characteristically substituted seven indications of his own which are not true marks at all. They cannot be recognized more readily than the Church herself, nor can they serve as distinguishing features of the true Church of Christ.

In this respect the Lambeth Conference seems to have copied from Luther. The Report asserts that

the visible and recognizable marks by which the visible Church can be seen and known by men are the following: "(*a*) The profession of faith in God as revealed and incarnate in Christ; (*b*) the observance of the two Sacraments ordained by Christ himself; (*c*) an ideal of the Christian life protected by a common discipline; (*d*) a ministry representative of the Church, for the preaching of the Word, the administration of the Sacraments, and the maintenance of the unity and continuity of the Church's witness and work."

There is a close similarity between these so-called marks and those assigned by Luther. It is quite clear that they cannot serve to distinguish the true Church of Christ from false claimants of that honour. They are the common characteristics of all, or nearly all, the heretical and schismatical bodies which have separated from the Church since the days of the Apostles. It is hard to understand how the Lambeth Conference could accept and endorse the assertion of the Report that they have been regarded as the marks of the true Church "since the days of the Apostles." And yet, sad to say, the Report is compelled to confess that when tested even by these so-called marks "some of the Christian Churches may be so defective that they cannot rightly be judged to be parts of the one visible Church of Christ at all."

That portion of the Report which deals with the Christian Ministry begins by stating that the Christian

ministry is a divine ordinance and that it has been an integral part of the organized life of the Church from the beginning. It exercises the powers and functions which are inherent in the Church in the name and by the authority of Christ himself. No one may take this honour upon himself. The Christian minister must have an inward call from God and an outward commission given him by the authorities of the Church. It is in accordance with Apostolic practice and the ancient custom of the Church that this commission should be given through Ordination by the laying on of hands and prayer of those who have authority to ordain. The members of the Committee and of the Joint Conference express their belief that divine grace is thus given to the ordained in response to prayer and faith.

The wording of these general propositions is carefully chosen, and it is not wonderful that they met with acceptance by the Joint Conference. Difficulties begin to appear when we descend to details. What is the nature of those powers and functions inherent in the Church which are exercised by the Christian ministry?

The teaching of the Catholic Church on this point is precise, clear, and by no means without warrant of Scripture. Christ left a twofold spiritual power in his Church: the power of Orders and the power of Jurisdiction. The power of Orders is the power to consecrate the Body and Blood of Christ, to

administer it in Holy Communion, together with all that is needful for the proper exercise of this power and all that it implies. It thus comprises also the power to forgive sins in the Sacrament of Penance. The power of jurisdiction gives authority to preach the Word of God, to bind and loose, or to make laws, and to govern, direct, and correct the faithful who are subject to it. All this the Catholic ministry does in the name and by the authority of Christ. It has pleased Christ that the power of Orders should be transmitted through the higher to the inferior ranks of the clergy by Ordination. Ordination consists essentially of the laying on of hands and of prayer. It is a sacred rite which gives the power of consecrating the Body and Blood of Christ, and makes the minister capable of forgiving the sins of those who are subject to him. Ordination also gives the grace which is necessary for the dutiful exercise of the spiritual powers which it confers. Neither the Apostles nor their successors could have annexed to Ordination the power of producing effects such as these. God alone can give an external rite the power of giving grace. Ordination, then, by the laying on of hands and prayer is a sacred sign which produces grace; it is a sacrament which has been instituted by Christ. It must be administered according to the rite instituted by Christ by one of the higher rank of the clergy according to an ordinance of Christ. If it is otherwise administered it is no sacrament, no

ordination at all, and it does not give grace or transmit any spiritual powers. Thus the power of Orders which is inherent in the Church must be transmitted from one to another, from bishops to priests, by means of the Sacrament of Orders. Those ministers who exercise their sacred functions in the Church to-day have received power and authority to do so from their predecessors, who in like manner received it through Ordination from their predecessors, and so on up to the Apostles. Apostolicity, then, or the transmission of Orders and Jurisdiction from the Apostles, is a necessary mark of the Church of Christ. If any modern religious body has tampered with the Sacrament of Orders so that it is no longer what Christ made it, that religious body has lost the Christian ministry and is no longer an integral portion of the Church of Christ. That is precisely what happened in the Church of England at the time of the Reformation, and for that reason Leo XIII declared that Anglican Orders are null and void. For similar reasons most of the Protestant bodies have lost the Christian ministry.

The seventh paragraph of this section of the report is so curious and so tell-tale that I transcribe the whole of it.

"Within the many Christian Communions into which, in the course of history, Christendom has been divided, various forms of ministry have grown up according to the circumstances of these several

Communions and their beliefs as to the mind of Christ and the guidance of the New Testament. These various ministries of Word and Sacrament have been, in God's Providence, manifestly and abundantly used by the Holy Spirit in his work of 'enlightening the world, converting sinners, and perfecting saints.' But the differences which have arisen with regard to the authority and functions of these various forms of ministry have been and are the occasion of manifold doubts, questions, and misunderstandings. For the allaying of doubts and scruples in the future, and for the more perfect realization of the truth that the ministry is a ministry of the Church and not merely of any part thereof, means should be provided for the United Church which we desire, whereby its ministry may be acknowledged by every part thereof as possessing the authority of the whole body."

The report, then, acknowledges that the Christian ministry is a divine ordinance and that it exercises its powers in the name and by the authority of Christ. Since the days of the Apostles the ministry has been perpetuated by Ordination, by a sacramental rite. The separated communions changed the rite in use by the early Church in order to suit their own circumstances and their own beliefs as to the mind of Christ and their private interpretation of the New Testament. Hence various forms of ministry which now cause doubts, scruples, and misunderstandings. To

allay these is necessary if we are to have a united Church of the future. They cannot be allayed by again tampering with the institution of Jesus Christ. The only possible way is to recover that institution by accepting it from the Catholic Church, which has preserved it faithfully from the beginning.

CHAPTER XVII

RESERVED CASES

§ 1. Preliminary.

IN the Sacrament of Penance a priest forgives sin committed after Baptism by a judicial sentence; "I absolve thee from thy sins," he says to the penitent. In other words, the priest is a judge in the internal tribunal of the Sacrament of Penance. But a judge must have jurisdiction or authority not only over the delinquent, but over the particular case which is in question if his sentence is to be effective. The jurisdiction of inferior judges is limited to ordinary and common cases. Magistrates can deal with cases of assault and battery, but if a case of murder is brought before them, they commit it to the assizes. For good reasons the Church has imitated this method of procedure of the civil courts. The jurisdiction of the inferior clergy in the tribunal of penance is limited to ordinary and common cases. More difficult cases which require special knowledge or special treatment are reserved to the higher ecclesiastical tribunals, where, it is presumed, they will be treated with the skill and tact which they require.

Such cases are known in moral theology and canon law as Reserved Cases, and the new Code of Canon Law has much to say about them.

Confessors, of course, should be familiar with the Catholic doctrine concerning reserved cases, but it is the wish of the Church that the laity should also be acquainted with it. One of the objects aimed at by the reservation of cases is to deter Catholics from committing them, and this object cannot be attained in any full measure unless they know what they are. I propose, then, to give briefly and clearly the common doctrine about reserved cases in the Catholic Church. In this chapter I propose to treat of the matter in general; in the sections which follow I will treat of particular cases.

The Holy See uses its authority to reserve about thirty cases to itself. Of these some are most specially reserved, others are specially reserved, and others again simply reserved. About ten more cases are reserved to Bishops either by the Holy See or by Provincial law. Besides these, Bishops commonly reserve two or three other cases to themselves by their own authority.

All cases reserved by the Holy See and some cases reserved by Bishops have a censure of excommunication, suspension, or interdict annexed to them. It is the absolution of the censure which is reserved primarily, and when on account of ignorance or for any other reason the censure has not been incurred,

or when absolution from it has been obtained, the reservation of the sin ceases, and any confessor may absolve it. An exception to this rule is the sin of false accusation of solicitation brought against a confessor, which remains reserved to the Holy See, although the censure annexed to it may not have been incurred in some particular case, or may have been absolved.

The Church intends her discipline to help towards the sanctification and salvation of souls. On this account she tempers her reservation of cases by a wise leniency when it would be an obstacle rather than a help towards the end which she has in view. Accordingly there is no reservation of sins or censures when the penitent is in danger of death. In such a case any priest has the fullest faculties to grant absolution for all sins and censures, but if the sick person recovers and was absolved by an ordinary priest from a censure inflicted on him personally, or from one most specially reserved to the Holy See, he is bound afterwards to submit his case to him who inflicted the censure, or to the Holy See, or to some confessor who has special faculties for it, and obey the commands imposed on him. If he does not do this he falls again under the same censure.

Moreover, when it is necessary for a penitent to receive absolution in order to avoid scandal, or loss of reputation, or because he has to make his Easter duties, or for similar reasons, or because he finds it

hard to remain any longer in a state of sin, he may be absolved at once by any confessor from any reserved case, but subsequently he must submit his case within a month to the proper authorities, or to a confessor who has special faculties for it.

All reservation of sins ceases in several cases mentioned by the new Code. It ceases when the sick who cannot leave the house make their confession, and when confession is made by those who are about to marry with a view to marriage. If special faculties cannot be asked for from the superior without serious inconvenience to the penitent or without danger of violating the seal of confession, a reserved sin may be absolved by an ordinary confessor. If a penitent has incurred a Bishop's reserved case in one diocese, but knows that in a neighbouring diocese the case is not reserved, nothing prevents him from making his confession to a priest in the latter diocese and obtaining absolution from his reserved sin. Every Catholic has the fullest liberty to go to confession to any priest who has faculties in the place, and such a priest can absolve from all sins to which his jurisdiction extends. Not only the Bishop, but the Vicar-General and the Canon Penitentiary can absolve from all Bishop's cases. Deans can also do the same, and they should be empowered to grant faculties to other priests for a reserved case on request.

Parish priests can absolve from Bishop's cases during the time allowed for making the Easter duties,

and missionaries can do the same whilst a mission is being given by them to the people.

When a penitent confesses a reserved sin the confessor will put certain questions to assure himself whether the reservation was incurred or not. If it was incurred and if it does not come under one of the preceding heads, he will tell the penitent to go to someone who has special faculties for the case, or if the penitent desires it and can wait for absolution, the confessor will tell him to come again, and in the meantime he will obtain special faculties to deal with the case.

§ 2. The Seal of Confession.

One who comes to the knowledge of anything concerning another which is not public and which cannot be made known without doing him an injury or causing him reasonable displeasure is bound to keep the matter secret. If he does not keep it secret he commits a sin by violating justice and charity. For justice and charity bind us to do nothing to the hurt or reasonable displeasure of our neighbour. After becoming aware of the secret a person may promise him whose secret it is not to reveal it. He will then be bound to keep the matter secret by the additional obligation of a promise. Sometimes people consult others about their secret affairs in order to obtain their advice and help. In such cases, whether an express stipulation to observe secrecy is made or

not, the person consulted is bound by the strictest natural secret not to betray the trust placed in him.

When a penitent goes to confession and makes known his sins to the priest he is driven thereto by divine command and by his desire to receive absolution. He makes known his sins as an act of religion, and his self-manifestation is protected by the virtue of religion. The improper use of knowledge of matter connected with confession is the violation of a secret of a special character; it is a sin of sacrilege. Priests, then, and all others who in any way come to the knowledge of what has been confessed in the Sacrament of Penance, are by the very nature of things bound by a religious obligation to keep the matter secret. This is the strictest of all secrets, and it is called the seal of confession.

For centuries no positive law of the Church was required to oblige the faithful either to go to Holy Communion or to go to confession when it was necessary. Custom and the desire to receive the sacraments was sufficient in general to keep them to their duty. The Fourth Council of the Lateran, held in 1215, made a law which obliged all who had come to years of discretion to go to confession and to receive Holy Communion at least once a year, and that at Easter or thereabouts. To this law the Council added these words: " Moreover, let the confessor take care in no wise to betray the sinner, either by word, or sign, or in any other way, but if he needs more

prudent advice let him ask it with caution, without any manifestation of the person concerned, since we decree that one who presumes to reveal a sin made known to him in the tribunal of penance, is not only to be deposed from the priestly office, but is also to be placed in a strict monastery, there to do perpetual penance." The law was not new, but the penalty for violating the law was a new one. It was intended to reassure the penitent and to help him to make a full confession to his priest without any fear of an improper use being made of his confession.

The new Code of Canon Law has made the law more explicit and has changed somewhat the penalty for its violation. According to Canon 889: "The sacramental seal is inviolable, wherefore let the confessor take diligent care lest by word, or sign, or in any other way, he betray the sinner in any wise for any reason whatever. An interpreter also and all others to whom knowledge derived from confession may come in any way are bound by the obligation of keeping the sacramental seal." The new penalties for violating the seal of confession are enacted in Canon 2369:

"Excommunication most specially reserved to the Holy See awaits the confessor who presumes to violate directly the sacramental seal. One who does this only indirectly is liable to suspension from saying Mass, hearing confessions," and other penalties.

We have seen before what is implied by excom-

munication most specially reserved to the Holy See. In order to incur this excommunication by the very fact a confessor must act presumptuously, that is, with full consciousness of what he is doing and with full knowledge of the censure incurred. This censure is inflicted for direct violation of the seal. Direct is distinguished from indirect violation. A confessor violates the seal directly if he makes known the penitent who has told him something connected with confession which he also makes known. If he makes known something which is protected by the seal of confession and indicates something which may lead to the betrayal of the penitent, he is guilty of indirect violation of the seal. One who is only guilty of indirect violation of the seal does not incur excommunication or any penalty by the very fact. But one who has been convicted of the crime should be suspended from saying Mass and from hearing confessions, or also, according to the gravity of the offence, be declared incapable of hearing them; he should be deprived of all benefices, dignities, of active and passive voice, and he should be declared incapable of such privileges, and in more serious cases he should be degraded.

Only confessors incur these severe penalties for the crime of direct or indirect violation of the seal of confession. But interpreters may have been made use of in order to make a full confession. Theologians may be consulted about some difficult case.

Superiors are asked for special faculties in order that absolution may be given for some reserved case. Sometimes a person who was near the confessional when a penitent was confessing his sins may have overheard something that was said. All these are also bound to secrecy by the sacramental seal, and anybody else who in any way becomes possessed of knowledge protected by the seal of confession. If any such person violates the obligation under which he lies, he is not subject to the severe penalties inflicted on confessors who may have been guilty of the same crime. But Canon 2369 prescribes that he should be punished by the infliction of salutary penalties, which may be excommunication, according to the gravity of the offence.

§ 3. Abuse of the Blessed Sacrament.

While the Protestant Reformation was being hatched in Germany grave religious and moral disorders were not unknown even in Italy. At the beginning of the sixteenth century an official of the Holy Office in Lombardy reported to the Holy See that many men and women in that province openly abandoned the Christian religion and adopted Satan for their lord and patron. They used spells and practised magical arts for the destruction of cattle and the fruits of the earth. They abused the Christian Sacraments, and especially the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar. The official complained

that not only laymen, but ecclesiastics also, denied that he had authority to deal with such cases. He therefore requested the Pope to declare and confirm his authority to punish such crimes and excesses. This was done by the issue of a Brief by Pope Julius II. The authority conferred by this Brief was extended to the officials of the Holy Office in other provinces of Italy by Pope Adrian VI in 1522. In 1677 complaints were made that consecrated Hosts were stolen and then kept or given to others for an evil purpose. The spiritual penalties inflicted for such offences by the officials of the Holy Office were found to be insufficient to prevent them, and Innocent XI ordered such as had been proved guilty of such crimes by the Holy Office to be handed over to the secular arm to be dealt with by the more rigorous methods of secular justice. Alexander VIII, Benedict XIV, and Clement XIII found it necessary to repeat the injunctions of their predecessors in this matter, and to make them more clear and precise.

Abuse of the Blessed Sacrament is not unknown even in our days, but the Church cannot avail herself of the secular arm for the punishment and suppression of such spiritual offences. And yet it was well that she should show her horror of such crimes in the new Code of Canon Law. This she has done in Canon 2320, which may be translated as follows:

"Anyone who throws away the consecrated elements, or takes them away or retains them for an

evil purpose, is suspected of heresy, incurs at once excommunication most specially reserved to the Holy See, is *ipso facto* infamous, and if a cleric he must be deposed."

The severity of the penalties inflicted by this Canon shows how grievously in the eyes of the Church are all serious sins committed against the Blessed Sacrament. Still, the only crimes which are expressly punished by the Canon are the throwing away of the consecrated species, or the taking of them away or the retaining of them for a bad purpose. One has heard of the Blessed Sacrament being found on the floor of the church; someone must have thrown it there. Again, one has heard of the Blessed Sacrament being taken home in the handkerchief, and kept there. It could not have been taken or kept for a good purpose. Such abuses of the Blessed Sacrament as those actions contain are expressly penalized by the Canon. Persons who have committed any of these actions are declared in the first place to be suspected of heresy. The term, like those which follow, is technical, and is explained in Canon 2315. There it is laid down that one who is suspected of heresy, and who does not remove the cause of suspicion after being admonished, is excluded from acting in the ecclesiastical courts, from the administration of Church property, from the office of sponsor in baptism or confirmation, from voting in ecclesiastical elections, and exercising the rights of patron-

age. Moreover, if he is a cleric, after admonition has been repeated without fruit, he is to be suspended from divine offices, so that he can neither administer the sacraments nor preach. Finally, if, after being suspected of heresy for six months, he has not amended, he becomes obnoxious to the penalties of heresy and is to be treated as a heretic.

One who has been guilty of any of the crimes mentioned above incurs by the very fact excommunication most specially reserved to the Holy See. This implies that he cannot be absolved by anyone else without very special faculties. In danger of death, indeed, he may be absolved by any priest, but if he recovers he is bound to have recourse to the Sacred Penitentiary under pain of falling again under the same censure.

The Canon declares anyone who has been guilty of any of the above crimes to be infamous with the infamy of law. It declares him to have lost all reputation which he enjoyed before, and by ecclesiastical law he becomes subject to many disabilities. He is irregular, disqualified for ecclesiastical benefices, pensions, offices, dignities; after sentence of the court he cannot vote in canonical elections, nor act as sponsor in baptism or confirmation. He cannot exercise the right of patronage, he is not admitted to appear as a witness in an ecclesiastical trial, nor as an expert or arbiter; if the infamy is publicly known he ought to be refused Holy Communion.

Finally, if the delinquent is a cleric, he must be deposed. By deposition a cleric is permanently deprived of all offices, benefices, dignities, pensions, and functions in the Church and becomes incapable of acquiring them in future. But he is not deprived of the clerical privileges nor reduced to the state of a layman, and he remains subject to the obligations of celibacy and the recitation of the divine Office.

§ 4. Personal Inviolability of the Clergy.

What has been dedicated in a special manner to the service of God belongs to him in a special manner, and should be treated with reverence and respect. The reverence and respect which is due in the first place to God is transferred in some measure to what has been dedicated to him. It is right and proper to treat churches with reverence for the sake of him to whom they are dedicated. Persons and places which have been dedicated to the service of God by lawful authority are called sacred. The Catholic Church uses special rites when she dedicates persons and places to the service of God. These are either consecrations, in which holy oil is used, or constitutive blessings, in which holy oil is not used. Clerics are dedicated to the service of God by the tonsure, and thereby they become sacred persons, to be treated with reverence by the faithful, as Canon 119 declares. The same Canon declares that those who inflict a real injury on clerics are guilty of sacrilege. Religious

are dedicated to the service of God by the profession of the evangelical counsels; they thereby become sacred persons, and personal sacrilege is committed by inflicting any real injury on them.

This was understood by the faithful in the earliest ages of the Church. Crimes of violence committed against the clergy and religious had a special heinousness attached to them. In the Penitential Book attributed to St Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury, towards the close of the seventh century, we read: "If a layman kills another layman out of hatred and does not wish to lay aside his arms, let him do penance for seven years, three without flesh-meat and wine." If anyone killed a cleric or monk the laying aside of his arms was no longer optional. The next decree of the same penitential prescribed that he should do that, and, moreover, enter a monastery or do penance for seven years.

In the twelfth century would-be reformers, like Arnold of Brescia, excited great hostility against clerics and monks by denying their right to own property. Crimes of violence against them increased, and Innocent II, in the Second Council of the Lateran, not only condemned Arnold of Brescia, but made a celebrated law for the protection of clerics and religious which came to be known as the privilege of the Canon. As far as concerns our present purpose, this law enacted that if anyone at the instigation of the devil incurred the guilt of sacrilege by laying violent

hands on a cleric or monk, he was by the very fact excommunicated. This law was maintained in its rigour until the issue of the new Code. Notorious breakers of it derived no advantage from the mitigation of the effects of excommunication introduced by Pope Martin V. The absolution of the old censure was simply reserved to the Pope. The new Code increases its rigour as far as the higher clergy are concerned; as far as regards the lower clergy and religious, its rigour is somewhat mitigated. It will be well to give a translation of the new law as it stands in Canon 2343:

Section 1.—Anyone who lays violent hands on the person of the Roman Pontiff:

(1) Incurs excommunication by the very fact reserved in a most special manner to the Holy See, and by the very fact he is to be avoided as excommunicate.

(2) He is infamous by law.

(3) If he is a cleric he is to be degraded.

Section 2.—Anyone who lays violent hands on the person of a Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church or a Legate of the Roman Pontiff:

(1) Incurs by the very fact excommunication in a special manner reserved to the Holy See.

(2) He is infamous by law.

(3) Let him be deprived of benefices, offices, dignities, pensions, and any post which he may have held in the Church.

Section 3.—Anyone who lays violent hands on the person of a Patriarch, Archbishop, Bishop, even though only titular, incurs excommunication by the very fact specially reserved to the Holy See.

Section 4.—Anyone who lays violent hands on the person of other clerics or of religious of either sex incurs by the very fact excommunication reserved to his own Ordinary, who besides according to his prudence should punish him with other penalties if the case require it.

By way of explanation it will be sufficient to say a word or two on some of the technical terms employed in this Canon.

To lay violent hands upon a cleric means any external and grievously sinful action which in any way injures the person, the liberty or the dignity of the cleric. The person is thus injured by killing, wounding, beating, or knocking down. The cleric's liberty is injured by unlawful imprisonment or detention against his will, even in a private place. His dignity is thus injured by knocking off his hat, by spitting on him, by tearing his clothes. The phrase signifies an injurious action, not mere words or threats. However, as the examples given sufficiently indicate, it is not necessary that a physically serious injury should be inflicted on a cleric in order that the censure may be incurred. It will be sufficient if it is an action which is seriously contrary to the reverence

and respect due to the cleric or religious and unjustly inflicted on him.

It will be noticed that the censure which protects the personal inviolability of the Roman Pontiff is most specially reserved to the Holy See, while that which protects Cardinals, Archbishops, and Bishops is specially reserved to the Holy See, and that which protects the inferior clergy and religious, even novices, lay brothers, and lay sisters, is reserved to their own Ordinary. In the case of religious men this will be their own higher Superior.

On a former occasion we have seen what is implied by infamy of law.

In general, in order that an excommunicated person must be avoided by the faithful, he must be excommunicated by name and by the Holy See, the excommunication must be made public, and in the decree it must be said expressly that he is to be avoided. These conditions are not required in the case of one who has laid violent hands on the Roman Pontiff. He is to be avoided by all who are aware of his crime.

§ 5. Cases Arising out of Papal Elections.

There are several cases of censures most specially reserved to the Holy See incurred by those who violate certain regulations made by the Church for the holding of papal elections. My readers are not likely to be called upon to take part in papal elections, and

so they are not likely to incur any of these cases. Still, whatever concerns the Head of the Church has an interest for Catholics, and so I have no hesitation in saying something about this subject here.

The Church jealously guards her liberty in the appointment of a new Pontiff to fill the chair of St Peter. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Catholic governments of Spain, Austria, and France began to claim the right of Veto or Exclusion. By this they claimed the right to exclude any particular Cardinal who might be obnoxious to them from election to the Papacy. There are several instances on record in which Spain, Austria, or France exercised this so-called right during the seventeenth and subsequent centuries. The Church never admitted the right, though she may have deferred to it at times from motives of prudence. Gregory XV, by a Bull issued in 1621, bade the Cardinals perform their duty in the election of a new Pope irrespective of what civil authorities might say or do. Subsequent Pontiffs repeated the injunctions, but what happened in the Conclave of 1903 when Pius X was elected seemed to call for more drastic measures than had been adopted hitherto. It appeared likely that Cardinal Rampolla would be elected to succeed Leo XIII, but at a critical moment an Austrian Cardinal arose in the Conclave and announced to the Cardinals that such an election would be displeasing to the Austrian Emperor. It was suspected that a

non-Catholic sovereign was pulling the wires behind the scenes, and this made the incident all the more intolerable.

Before the end of the first year of his Pontificate Pius X issued the Constitution which will make any attempt of any civil power to interfere in papal elections by means of the Veto highly improbable. The two countries concerned in this last attempt to exercise the Veto are now Republics, and are not likely to put forward any claim to exercise it in future. However, the Constitution of Pius X has been inserted in the new Code of Canon Law, and thus is part of the law of the Catholic Church. The operative clause may be translated as follows:

" In virtue of holy obedience, under threat of the divine judgement and under pain of excommunication to be incurred forthwith and most specially reserved to the future Pontiff, we prohibit each and all of the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, both present and future, the Secretary of the Sacred College, and all others who take part in the Conclave, to receive the *Veto* or *Exclusion* under any pretext from any civil power whatever, even if it is to be proposed under the form of a simple desire, or to manifest this *Veto* in whatever way it is known to them, either to the whole College of Cardinals, gathered together, or to the Cardinals singly, either in writing or by word of mouth, directly in person or indirectly through others. And this prohibition we extend to all the above-

mentioned interventions, intercessions, and all other ways in which lay powers of whatever degree or order may desire to meddle in papal elections."

To make the exercise of the Veto still more difficult all Cardinals now promise on oath to comply with the requirements of the Constitution of Pius X. It is not likely, then, that any future Conclave will be disturbed by the exercise of the Veto of any civil power.

About a year after the issue of the Constitution of Pius X which we have been discussing, the same Pontiff published another Constitution, which modernized and codified the Church's legislation about papal elections. It contains eight other censures of excommunication most specially reserved to the Holy See inflicted on those who may be guilty of violating its provisions. During the Conclave a bell is rung twice a day, morning and evening, to call the Cardinals to the place of voting. If any Cardinal, not prevented by sickness, fail to go to the appointed place at the sound of the bell, he incurs excommunication.

No letters or printed or written documents may be sent either to those who are in the Conclave or from them to people outside, without first being examined by Prelates designated for the purpose. Anyone who violates this law incurs excommunication. An oath of secrecy is taken by all who are in the Conclave, and anyone who violates it is *ipso facto* excommunicated. The same penalty is inflicted on Cardinals who tell

their servants or anybody else secrets concerning the voting or what has been done in their general meetings. The crime of simony in the election is punished by the same penalty. During the lifetime of a Pope it is forbidden without consulting him to treat of the election of a successor, and anyone who does this, even though he be a Cardinal, is *ipso facto* excommunicated. According to the law of the Church, all pacts, conventions, and agreements by which any Cardinals strive to bind each other to give or not to give their vote to particular persons or groups are null and void, and such attempts are punished by excommunication. As soon as a Cardinal accepts the supreme Pontificate after a valid election he becomes Pope with full jurisdiction by right divine. Anyone who impugns the authority of letters which may be issued by him before he is crowned is punished by excommunication.

§ 6. Heretics, Apostates, and Schismatics.

The Catholic Church is the union, the society of all the faithful, of all those who believe the Gospel of Jesus Christ and recognize him and his Vicar as their head. Faith, then, is an essential condition of membership of the society founded by Jesus Christ. "He that believeth not shall be condemned." "Without faith it is impossible to please God." But this divine society, like every other corporation or union, has a head, who is none other than its Founder,

Jesus Christ. Moreover, as the Church militant on earth is a visible society, Christ gave it a visible head to rule it in his name and by his authority. This Vicar of Christ is the Pope; there is no other claimant for the office. A member of the Church, then, must be subject to the Pope. If anyone refuses to be subject to the head of the society to which he belongs, he becomes a rebel, and is cut off from membership by his own act. "If he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican," said our Lord. On these principles, heretics, apostates, and schismatics have always been considered as branches cut off from the mystical vine, from the Church, and from Christ by their own act. St Paul wrote to Titus: "A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid. Knowing that he that is such an one is subverted and sinneth, being condemned by his own judgement." The same Apostle wrote to Timothy that he had delivered certain heretics up to Satan, that they might learn not to blaspheme. He told the Corinthians that those who made schisms in the Church acted as if they would divide Christ. They strove to divide his mystical body, the Church.

The Church has always considered heretics, apostates, and schismatics as excommunicated persons, but her discipline with regard to them has varied somewhat in minor details from age to age. Here I consider them as persons who have incurred a censure

which is specially reserved to the Holy See by the new Code.

According to Canon 1325:

"A heretic is one who, after receiving baptism and still retaining the name of a Christian, pertinaciously denies or doubts any article which has to be believed by divine and Catholic faith."

"One who altogether abandons the Catholic faith is an apostate."

"A schismatic is one who refuses to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff or refuses to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him."

In order, then, to incur the guilt of heresy, a baptized person must deny or positively doubt some doctrine which has been revealed by God and which is proposed by the Catholic Church as an article of divine faith. He must do this pertinaciously; that is, he must know that the doctrine in question is proposed by the Church as an article of divine faith and yet obstinately cling to his own opinion. One who through ignorance denies or doubts an article of the faith is not a heretic in the strict sense; he is a material, not a formal, heretic.

An apostate has altogether discarded the teaching of the Catholic Church, whether he has joined any other religious body or not.

A schismatic is one who refuses to be subject to the head of the Church or who refuses to communicate with those who are subject to him. He is not merely

disobedient to an authority which he recognizes; he refuses to recognize the authority. To incur the penalties, formal schism is required; merely material schism is not sufficient.

The penalties incurred by apostates, heretics, and schismatics according to the new Code are laid down in Canon 2314. Besides other penalties, on which we need not dwell here, they incur by the very fact excommunication; and the absolution of this censure is in general specially reserved to the Holy See. Then follows a paragraph in the Code which throws light on the procedure followed in the reception of a convert into the Church from heresy or schism. In her external government, when non-Catholics ask to be received into the Church, she presumes that they have fallen under this excommunication. She knows nothing of their good faith in her external tribunal. But, in spite of the censure being specially reserved to the Holy See, if a case is brought in any way, even by voluntary confession, as in the case of a convert, before the local Ordinary, either he or his delegate is empowered to deal with it. He should receive the abjuration of heresy to be made by the convert according to law before the local Ordinary or his delegate and two witnesses, and observe whatever else is prescribed for the case. He or his delegate may then grant absolution in the external tribunal from the censure of excommunication; and after such absolution any confessor, even without special

faculties, is empowered to give absolution for the sin of heresy or schism or apostasy, if any such sin has been committed by the convert.

This will explain why the leave of the Bishop should be required for the reception of a convert into the Church. An additional reason for such leave being required is because converts are usually adults, and Canon 744 prescribes that the baptism of adults is to be notified to the Bishop, so that if he chooses, in person or by his delegate, the baptism may be performed with greater solemnity. Most converts in this country at least are baptized conditionally when they are received into the Church on account of prudent doubt concerning their previous baptism.

§ 7. Books Forbidden under Censure.

Common sense, as well as the teaching of the Church, tells us that it is wrong without good reason to put ourselves in the proximate occasion of committing sin. We very soon learn that the reading of bad books is a proximate occasion of sin. If we want a healthy body we must give it healthy food; and if we want a healthy mind, healthy food must be given to it, too. Impure literature is bad for the soul, and so is infidel and heretical literature. Balmes, the well-known Spanish writer of the last century, was obliged to read many infidel and heretical books in order to defend Catholic doctrine from their attacks. He found that such reading had a bad effect on him; it

left a bad taste in the mouth, which he used to counteract by reading a chapter of the *Imitation of Christ*.

It is the duty of the Catholic Church to guide and instruct her children in all that concerns faith and morals. She is the Shepherd of our souls, and it is her right and duty to provide us with healthy food for our souls and to warn us to avoid unhealthy pastures. One of the ways in which she has done this from very early times is by prohibiting bad books against faith or morals. In the new Code of Canon Law the regulations on the subject which have been made from time to time are codified. A dozen canons, some of them containing many subsections, are devoted to the subject. We are told that not only the Pope can prohibit books for the whole Church, but that particular synods, local Ordinaries, and Religious Prelates with the Chapters may do the same for their own subjects.

When a book has been condemned by the Holy See, all translations of it into other languages are also forbidden. A number of general rules are laid down forbidding certain kinds of books in general, but particular books are often condemned by name. This usually happens because someone has denounced such books to ecclesiastical authority as being dangerous to faith or morals. When a book has been prohibited, it is thereby forbidden to publish, read, keep, sell, translate, or in any way to give it to others

without leave. Leave for reading and keeping forbidden books may be obtained from the Holy See by those who need it. Local Ordinaries can give particular leave to read and keep a book for good reason to their subjects, and sometimes they receive more ample faculties from the Holy See.

Like other laws of the Church, the laws about forbidden books bind under pain of mortal sin in grave matter, but no special penalty is incurred by transgressors except in the cases mentioned in Canon 2318. That Canon may be translated thus:

"The publishers of the books of apostates, heretics, and schismatics which propound apostasy, heresy, and schism *ipso facto* incur excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See, as also do those who defend or knowingly without proper leave read or retain the same books, or others prohibited by name by apostolic letters.

"Authors and publishers who procure the printing of books of Holy Scripture or of notes and commentaries on them without proper leave by the very fact incur excommunication reserved to no one."

It is obvious that no very large class of books is prohibited under pain of incurring this censure. Only those books come under it which propound apostasy, heresy, or schism, and which are written by apostates, heretics, or schismatics. A book which

does not propound apostasy, heresy, or schism, though written by an apostate, heretic, or schismatic, is not included under the censure, nor is a book which propounds apostasy, heresy, or schism, but which was written by an infidel. To propound apostasy, heresy, or schism is to maintain and defend it by advancing reasons in its behalf. A merely incidental heresy occurring in a book written by an apostate, heretic, or schismatic would not bring the book under the censure.

Not only the publishers of such books, but also those who defend them or who, knowing that they are forbidden under pain of censure, read or keep them without the required permission, incur excommunication.

Books are condemned by this Canon, not newspapers or articles in magazines, even though they defend heresy or schism and are written by heretics. A few books have been condemned by name, and the faithful have been forbidden to read them under pain of incurring excommunication, by Letters or Briefs or Bulls of the Pope himself. As examples may be mentioned Fénélon's *Explanation of the Maxims of the Saints,* and the *Spiritual Guide,* by Molinos. These books are included under Canon 2318. A Catholic who desires to publish any portion of Holy Scripture or notes or commentaries on Holy Scripture must obtain permission to do so from the Bishop. Authors and publishers who neglect to do this and

who have such productions printed incur excommunication, but any approved confessor can absolve them from the censure on repentance.

§ 8. Freemasonry.

The Church forbids Catholics to join secret societies. "Let the faithful avoid," says Canon 684, "secret, condemned, seditious, suspect societies, and those which strive to withdraw themselves from the lawful vigilance of the Church." If an organized body strive to conceal by the cloak of secrecy its members, its aims and object, and the means which it employs, the presumption is that it is organized against the public good. "Every one that hath evil hateth the light and cometh not to the light that his works may not be reproved." The heads of secret societies are generally unknown to the outside world, and often even to the members themselves. Yet the members are bound to obey them, often under oath. There is no guarantee that all the orders issued by the secret heads will be in accordance with right and justice, and it is wrong to promise obedience under such circumstances. To make such a promise is to abdicate personal responsibility. Freemasonry is not only a secret society, it is a secret society of a special kind, and the Catholic Church forbids Catholics to join it under pain of incurring excommunication, the absolution of which is reserved to the Holy See. This is laid down in Canon 2335:

" Those who join the Freemasons or other societies of the same kind which plot against the Church or lawful civil authority incur by the very fact excommunication simply reserved to the Apostolic See." A Catholic, then, who becomes a Freemason ceases to be a Catholic; he is cut off from membership with the Catholic Church.

Modern Freemasonry is a secret society of English origin and dates from the early part of the eighteenth century. It spread quickly, and it is said that it now numbers more than two million members and that it has lodges all over the world. Its activities soon attracted the attention of civil and ecclesiastical authority. Many governments, both civil and ecclesiastical, prohibited it. It was condemned under pain of excommunication by Pope Clement XII in the year 1738, and since then the condemnation has frequently been repeated by his successors.

The Popes have been perfectly frank and open in acknowledging the sources from which they derived their information concerning the society. In his well-known Encyclical, *Humanum Genus*, issued in 1884, Leo XIII said that the Holy See derived its information from the observations of the fruits of Masonic activity in various parts of the world, from the publication of the statutes, rites, and commentaries of the order, from the investigation of particular cases, from the personal testimony of men who had been in the secret, and from the delation of civil

governments. Clement XII had pointed out the radical flaw in the organization from the beginning. It drew men from any religion and sect, and, without requiring them to renounce or to profess any form of religion, it united them in the strictest bonds of unity. The practical consequence, as Leo XIII pointed out, was to bring about a complete indifference towards all forms of religion. But human nature does not stop there, it cannot rest satisfied with a mere negation. "He that is not with me is against me, and he that gathereth not with me scattereth." A creature cannot be indifferent to the claims of God and of Jesus Christ. If he is not on their side he soon becomes hostile to them. With inexorable logic, Leo XIII showed how indifference towards religion and the claims of God has led Masonry to modern Naturalism. Masons might believe what they pleased about the supernatural, they were united on the question of the natural, and they gave their exclusive attention to it. The attitude involves a practical rejection of Christianity and the adoption of neo-paganism. This accounts for many an error in religion and philosophy, in social and political affairs, in family life, and in the education of the young which form settled dogmas of modern thought. If what is called modern thought is not the creation of Masonry, at least Masonry has had great influence in making it so widely accepted.

Canon 2335 inflicts the penalty of excommunication,

not only on Freemasons, but on members of other societies of the same kind. There is some difference of opinion among the commentators as to the meaning of the phrase "societies of the same kind." Some of the latest and best authorities say that its meaning is defined by the clause which follows—"which plot, machinate, or work openly or in secret against the Church or lawful civil authority," so that Communists and other organizations of the same sort would come under the condemnation. Others hold that as Freemasonry is a secret society, the phrase "other societies of the same kind" can only comprehend secret societies which work against the Church or lawful civil authority. Of course, there is no doubt but that Communism is forbidden on other grounds, and by Canon 634.

Recent events in Italy seem to show that while it works in secrecy its influence is great, but that when it comes to power and is compelled to show itself, the fierce light which beats upon a throne tends to destroy the influence of Freemasonry.

§ 9. The Great Pillage.

Dr. Augustus Jessopp used to call the Protestant Reformation in England the Great Pillage. The name was a good one, and it indicated a very important aspect of that complex movement. It has been calculated that about one-third of the wealth of England at the time of the Reformation belonged to

the Catholic Church, and this huge sum was taken from the Catholic Church, and what did not find its way into the royal coffers went to found new families henceforth keenly interested in maintaining the new order, or served for the maintenance of the new national Church, or of the remnant of educational establishments that were left by the Reformers.

Dr. Jessopp's attitude was a little illogical. As a loyal clergyman of the Church of England as by law established, he held that the State or the nation could alienate Church property for a good purpose. That is not Catholic teaching. The Catholic Church in England before the Reformation was not the Church of England. It was a province, a portion of the Church Catholic or Universal; its dioceses, parishes, colleges, schools, and monasteries were subordinate societies or corporations of the one supreme and universal Society called the Catholic Church. The property of all these subordinate societies was the property of the Catholic Church. The Pope was recognized as the supreme head of the Catholic Church and the supreme administrator of all its property. When Cardinal Wolsey desired to appropriate the property of St Frideswide's and of other monasteries to the foundation of Christ Church at Oxford, he had to obtain a Bull for the purpose from Pope Clement VII. He only succeeded at the cost of considerable delay, subterfuge, and misrepresentation. He had very great powers at the time as papal

legate, but they did not enable him to alienate the property of the Catholic Church. When Henry VIII had made himself supreme head of the Church in England, it became an easy matter for him and his successors to rob the Church of its property.

Other northern countries of Europe witnessed similar proceedings. The example was infectious. Albert of Brandenburg, Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights, abandoned the Catholic Church and converted the possessions of the Order into the hereditary duchy of Prussia, a bad beginning for a fateful country.

Such glaring examples had many imitators on a smaller scale. The Council of Trent did its best to put a stop to the wholesale robberies of Church property. It enacted that if avarice, the root of all evil, so gains possession of any cleric or layman, of whatever dignity he may be, even though it be imperial or regal, that he has the presumption in any way to convert to his own use, usurp, or hinder from being received by those to whom of right they belong, the jurisdiction, property, income, and rights, fruits, emoluments, and produce of any church, secular or religious benefice, lending banks for the poor, or other pious institutions, which should relieve the necessities of their ministers and of the poor, such a one lies under excommunication until he has made full restitution of his ill-gotten gains, and has obtained absolution from the Pope.

This enactment of the Council of Trent has been in

substance reproduced in Canon 2346 of the new Code of Canon Law, and it is now one of the cases simply reserved to the Holy See. It is intended to safeguard the property of the Church as far as spiritual penalties can effect that object. Still, it is a penal law, and it must not be extended beyond due limits. A few cases will help to illustrate its application.

The Roman Congregations whose office it is to interpret and explain the law of the Church, have declared more than once that this censure is not incurred by common thieves and robbers who, for example, break into a church and steal a chalice or rob the poor-box. The censure is aimed at higher culprits who unjustly claim to make ecclesiastical property their own. Thieves and robbers merely seize the property and use it; they make no claim to be its owners. They are guilty of sacrilegious theft, and may be punished as such by spiritual penalties, but they do not incur this censure.

An executor or legatee who refused to pay to the priest a sum of money left by will for Masses would not seem to incur the censure. Of course he sins, and is bound to make restitution, but as the sum of money was not paid over to the Church, it never became ecclesiastical property.

On the other hand, a cleric who converted to his own use as if it were his personal property what had been contributed by the faithful for the general maintenance of religion would incur the censure.

The same must be said of collectors who appropriate to their personal use what they have received for the Church.

§ 10. The Sale of Indulgences.

The outbreak of the Protestant Reformation in Germany is dated by common consent from the Eve of All Saints, 1517. On that Eve Luther nailed his ninety-five propositions to the door of the Castle Church at Wittenberg and preached against the Catholic doctrine on Indulgences. Up to that time he had followed the ordinary Catholic doctrine on the subject and had taught that an indulgence is a remission valid before God of the temporal punishment due to sin, but in the ninety-five propositions he denied that an indulgence is valid before God, and asserted that it only remits canonical penance imposed by the Church. This heretical doctrine was accompanied by insulting and abusive language levelled against the Pope.

The granting of a Jubilee by Pope Leo X furnished the occasion for Luther's outbreak. The Pope wished to raise money for the building of St Peter's at Rome, and he granted a Jubilee to those who should contribute to this pious object and fulfil the other ordinary conditions for gaining an indulgence. Albert of Brandenburg, a Hohenzollern, Archbishop of Mainz and Magdeburg, entrusted the preaching of the indulgence within his archbishopric to Tetzel,

a Dominican friar. Tetzel was a popular preacher, and used popular methods in the task committed to him. When a fair was held in any town he would go there and proclaim his Jubilee. With his exposition of Catholic doctrine he would mix doubtful opinions of theologians and exaggerations of his own. He irritated Luther, who is said to have declared that please God he would knock a hole in Tetzel's drum. The remark may not be historical, but it expresses accurately enough the relations between the two friars. Luther's propositions were printed and circulated far and wide. In many quarters they met with a sympathetic reception; it was as if a lighted match had been thrown away among combustible material, and a great conflagration was the result.

The condition of contributing alms for some pious object along with other conditions required for gaining an indulgence is perfectly legitimate and not unusual. Before the time of the Council of Trent the promulgation of indulgences was frequently confided to pardoners, as they were called in England. The character and methods of these pardoners sometimes left much to be desired. So much we can gather from Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*. Their methods were reprobated by the Fourth Council of the Lateran, by the Council of Lyons, and by that of Vienne. As abuses still continued in spite of the repeated condemnation of the Church, the Council of Trent determined to abolish the name and office altogether.

This it did by the ninth decree of the twenty-first Session. It says that the remedies applied to the grave abuses of the pardoners by the Councils of the Lateran, Lyons, and Vienne having become useless, and since those abuses have rather grown to the scandal of the faithful to such an extent as to banish all hope of amendment, the Council abolishes the office altogether, and decrees that in future indulgences should be published by the local Ordinaries. To the local Ordinaries also was entrusted the duty of collecting the alms of the faithful, and without making any profit of transmitting them faithfully, so that all may understand that these heavenly treasures are disbursed not for gain but for spiritual good.

In spite of this decree of the Council of Trent certain objectionable practices continued to exist under plea of exemption and special privileges. St Pius V issued two Constitutions on the subject and imposed on the refractory the penalty of excommunication reserved to the Pope. It is this censure which in substance has been reproduced in Canon 2327 of the new Code of Canon Law. According to this Canon those who make gain out of indulgences are by the very fact punished with excommunication simply reserved to the Holy See.

§ 11. The Catholic Family.

The Church does her best to maintain, strengthen, and sanctify Catholic family life. She well knows how much depends on it for time and for eternity. She knows, too, that it can only be preserved and sanctified by the spirit of religion. Religion must be at the base of it, and religion must provide its guiding principles and aims. Unless the Lord build the house, they labour in vain who build it. A Catholic marriage is the foundation of the Catholic family, and the Catholic education of children is its end and object. There are many disruptive influences which threaten the Catholic family with ruin in modern society, and the Church has deemed it well to provide some additional sanctions for its preservation in the new Code of Canon Law. Some of these are set down in Canon 2319, which may be translated as follows:

"Those Catholics by the very fact incur excommunication reserved to the Ordinary:

"1. Who contract marriage before a non-Catholic minister against what is prescribed in Canon 1063.

"2. Who contract marriage with an explicit or implicit agreement that all or any of the children are to be brought up outside the Catholic Church.

"3. Who knowingly presume to offer their children to non-Catholic ministers to be baptized.

" 4. Parents or those who hold the place of parents who knowingly hand over their children to be educated or brought up in a non-Catholic religion."

According to the teaching of the Catholic Church marriage between baptized Christians is a sacrament, and she alone has the duty and right to see that the sacraments are properly administered and received. The parties to the contract are themselves the ministers to each other of the sacrament of marriage, but the Church requires for its validity that it be contracted before the parish priest or his delegate. Moreover, divine and ecclesiastical law forbid all communication in sacred rites between Catholics and non-Catholics. Accordingly Canon 1063, referred to above, prescribes that, although a dispensation for a mixed marriage may have been obtained from the Church, the spouses must not either before or after a marriage has been contracted before the Church appear also either in person or by proxy before a non-Catholic minister acting as such, in order to give or renew their matrimonial consent. Any Catholic who violates this law incurs the penalty of excommunication by the very fact, and the power of absolving him is reserved by the Holy See to the Bishop by Canon 2319, section 1.

By the law of England it used to be necessary for Catholics to contract marriage before the Anglican minister in order that their marriages might be recognized by the State. If similar circumstances

exist anywhere at present Canon 1063 expressly provides that Catholics may comply with the law to secure the civil effects of marriage.

When a mixed marriage was contracted it used to be no very uncommon thing for the parties to come to an understanding that the children should follow the religion of the parents according to sex. The boys were brought up in the religion of the father and the girls in that of the mother. The Church never approved of such understandings. They infringed the law of God and of the Church, which require a Catholic parent to bring up all his children in the religion which he believes and knows to be the only religion that is pleasing to God. To prevent such arrangements the Church requires both parties when a dispensation for a mixed marriage has been obtained from the Church to sign a written promise that all the children will be brought up Catholics. To ensure the faithful observance of this promise Canon 2319, as we have seen, inflicts the sentence of excommunication on all Catholics who contract marriage with an explicit or implicit agreement that all or any of the children are to be brought up as non-Catholics. The absolution of this censure is reserved to the Ordinary by the Holy See.

An unpleasant feature of the Protestant propaganda in some Catholic countries is the giving of clothes or money to such parents as are willing to bring their children to the Protestant ministers for baptism.

Large sums of money are collected in England and America and spent on such unworthy ways of corrupting poor Catholics. Catholics who knowingly presume to offer their children to non-Catholic ministers for baptism incur thereby excommunication, and the absolution of this censure is reserved to the Bishop. It is possible that by the very ignorant poor such a thing might be done in good faith. In that case the censure would not be incurred.

Similarly parents and those who are in the place of parents incur excommunication, reserved to the Bishop, if they knowingly hand over their own children or those committed to them to be educated or brought up in a non-Catholic religion. Sending children or permitting them to be sent to a non-Catholic school would not of itself be sufficient to draw down upon parents or guardians this excommunication. The essential condition for incurring the censure is handing the children over to be indoctrinated, trained, and brought up in a non-Catholic religion.

CHAPTER XVIII

FRUSTRATING NATURE

ABOUT a dozen years ago the National Council of Public Morals with official recognition established the National Birth-Rate Commission. Since then the Commission has issued several Reports, and a Special Commission was appointed to study the ethical side of the question. This Special Commission has now issued its Report under the title of *The Ethics of Birth Control*. This Report professes to adopt the Christian standpoint with regard to human life and its responsibilities. But for all that it is not able to announce any definite conclusions as to the morality or immorality of birth control. The subject, it says, needs much further investigation from the medical, economic, and religious point of view. In the meantime, no one can escape the personal responsibility of forming his own judgement on the question.

Four members of the Special Commission declared it to be their opinion that the use of contraceptives is a frustration of God's design in Nature and cannot be justified in any circumstances, but this opinion was rejected by the majority of the Special Com-

mission, and in a leading article on the subject, *The Times* newspaper endorsed the rejection. In support of this rejection it is said that civilization itself has been the story of man's control over Nature, and that rigid application of the principle advocated by the four members would entail the condemnation of all medical treatment. Medicine tries to arrest natural processes; it is an interference with Nature, an action against Nature.

Nevertheless, the principle adopted by the four members is a fundamental principle of Christian ethics, and if it is properly understood it does not involve the absurd consequences attributed to it. I will try briefly to show this.

Everybody knows that the reign of law is universal. We live in an ordered world. The physical and animal world are governed by necessary laws. The same causes are always followed by the same effects, and nothing else is possible. According to Christian teaching, the whole world inferior to man was created for man's use and benefit. In the beginning the Creator told man to rule and subdue the earth and everything that it contains. Man can subdue and control the physical world by learning to understand its laws, and in doing this for his own benefit he not only does nothing morally wrong, but he is fulfilling the intention of his Creator. When the doctor, then, destroys the germs of tubercular disease, he not only does nothing morally wrong, he performs an action

which in the highest degree is a moral action. He acts against Nature, contrary to Nature, in that he interferes with a natural process which threatens human life, but it is morally right for him to do that.

The reign of law extends to the sphere of human conduct. Certain actions are in accordance with moral law, others are contrary to it. Those actions which are in accordance with moral law are called right, ordinate, lawful; those that are contrary to it are called wrong, inordinate, unlawful. By considering an action in itself and in all its circumstances we can generally see quite clearly whether it is in accordance with moral law and right, or whether, on the contrary, it is against the moral law and wrong. It is clearly right for children to love, respect, and obey their parents, to render to every man what is his due, to wish well to all men, to practise temperance. It is clearly wrong for children to show disrespect to parents, to do unjust injury to others, to show hatred to one's fellow-man, to give way to intemperance in eating and drinking. We can discern the rule or law of temperance by considering the object of eating and drinking, the purpose which those actions should serve. Eating and drinking are for the sake of supporting life. The body derives heat and energy from food and drink, and bodily waste is repaired thereby. The end of eating and drinking indicates the rule which ought to govern those actions. We should eat and drink what supports life. We should abstain

from what injures or destroys life. We should eat and drink that quantity which is suitable for the end in view. If we eat or drink more or less than what conduces to our support we infringe the law of temperance, we act against the moral law, we are bound to preserve our life and to take the necessary means to do so.

We are bound to do what is right and abstain from what is wrong because our Creator and Lord wishes and commands it. He is the Author of the moral law, and because he is good and holy he cannot possibly be indifferent as to whether it is observed or not by his rational creatures. Man is not only a rational creature, he is also endowed with moral freedom. He can recognize the moral law, but, unlike the lower creation, he is not necessitated to obey it. He has the physical power of obeying it if he chooses to do so, but he has also the physical power to refuse obedience to it if he chooses. He can violate the law of temperance if he likes, but he will do so at his peril and to his ruin. What has been said about eating and drinking may be applied to the procreation of children. The means to that end are laid down by Nature and by the Author of Nature. In making use of the means the end furnishes the rule, and it must always be kept in sight so that nothing contrary to it may be done. If we forget the rule of temperance and follow appetite and pleasure in eating and drinking, we are sure to go astray. We

shall eat and drink too much, we shall act inordinately, and we shall frustrate God's design in Nature. Not less evidently and surely will they who use contraceptives act inordinately, violate the moral law, and frustrate God's design in Nature. We heartily agree, then, with the four members of the Special Commission. They defended a great and important principle of the moral law.

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